Mane
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Jean Paul Sartre
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All those eyes intent on me, devouring me. What, only two of you? I thought there were more, many more. So that is what hell is. I would never have believed it. You remember: the fire and brimstone, the torture. Ah! the farce. There is no need for torture: Hell is other people.
Without going outside our attitude of reflective description, we can encounter modes of consciousness which seem, even while themselves remaining strictly in for-itself, to point to a radically different type of ontological structure. This ontological structure is mine; it is in relation to myself as subject that I am concerned about myself, and yet this concern (for-myself) reveals to me a being which is my being without being-for-me.
Consider for example shame. [...] It is a non-positional self-consciousness, conscious (of) itself as shame... . ... it is a shameful apprehension of something and this something is me. I am ashamed of what I am. Shame therefore realizes an intimate relation of myself to myself. [...] ...it is in its primary structure shame before somebody. I have just made an awkward or vulgar gesture. This gesture clings to me; I neither judge it nor blame it. I simply live it. I realize it in the mode of for-itself. But now suddenly I raise my head. Somebody was there and has seen me. Suddenly I realize the vulgarity of my gesture, and I am ashamed. [...] ...the Other is the indispensable mediator between myself and me. I am ashamed of myself as I appear to the Other.
By the mere appearance of the Other, I am put in the position of passing judgement on myself as an object, for it is as an object that I appear to the Other. Yet this object which has appeared to the Other is not an empty image in the mind of another. [...] Shame is by nature recognition. I recognize that I am as the Other sees me.
Shame is an immediate shudder which runs through me from head to foot... .
Thus shame is shame of oneself before the Other; these two structures are inseparable. But at the same time I need the Other in order to realize fully all the structures of my being.
As a temporal-spatial object in the world I offer myself to the Other's appraisal. ...To be looked at is to apprehend oneself as the unknown object of unknowable appraisals- in particular, of value judgements. ... A judgement is the transcendental act of a free being. Thus being -seen constitutes me as a defenseless being for a freedom which is not my freedom. It is in this sense that we can consider ourselves as 'slaves' in so far as we appear to the Other. ... I am a slave to the degree that my being is dependent at the center of a freedom which is not mine and which is the very condition of my being. ...in so far as I am the instrument of possibilities which are not my possibilities, whose pure presence beyond my being I can not even glimpse, and which deny my transcendence in order to constitute me as a means to ends of which I am ignorant - I am in danger. This danger is not an accident but the permanent structure of my being for others.
...if we happen to appear 'in public' to act in a play or to give a lecture, we never lose sight of the fact that we are looked at, and we execute the ensemble of acts which we have come to perform in the presence of the look; better yet we attempt to constitute a being and an ensemble of objects for this look.
"My being for others is a fall through absolute emptiness toward objectivity. ... Thus myself-as-object is neither knowledge nor a unity of knowledge but an uneasiness, a lived wrenching away from the ecstatic unity of the Foritself, a limit which I cannot reach and which yet I am."