I define "ration" as the faculty by which we arrive at real information about the real universe we inhabit. This definition necessitates the following two criteria:
1.) the premises must be factual -- i.e. verifiable fact
2.) the conclusions arrived at must be arrived at via logic
A theory with false premises will not beget real information about the real universe we inhabit. A theory with conclusions drawn on the basis of anything other than logic will not beget real information about the real universe we inhabit.
I would hold that a given thing can be true without being scientifically verifiable. The reliability of perception, for instance.
You may define ration as something other than a faculty for arriving at real information about the real universe we inhabit, altering your criteria accordingly. However, if you do not define ration as such, then we are talking about different faculties.
This definition of "ration" seems largely workable to me (so long as one expands the definition of fact to include things ascertained by extra-scientific means). It's when you apply the criteria of testability and falsifiability that I am somewhat more skeptical.
Observing phenomenon and forming theories on the basis of observed phenomenon until the theory fails to adequately explain the observed phenomenon is still the way science is conducted.
It is true that there are a few who question the scientific method, such as the notorious "Vienna Circle" cited in the Wikipedia article, but it is a baseless exaggeration to say that falsifiability has "fallen out of favor".
I don't disagree that it's the way that science is conducted. It is certainly the way that science is conducted, and not a bad way to do it at all. As a "line of demarcation" between science and non-science, it is perfectly acceptable. It is the further assumption that only conclusions reached on the "science" side of that line that can be used as evidence for a theory that I find untenable. I will confess that I could be wrong about falsifiability falling out of favor. I'm more confident on this note vis a vis verifiability, but I'm not willing to abandon either position until I study more.
To be pointed, every "argument" I've seen from these dissenters has boiled down to, "Yeah, well, I don't think that's what science is, and I'm a philosopher!" If you are familiar with an argument against falsifiability that doesn't amount to this, I will certainly give it a perusal.
Meanwhile, on the basis of falsifiability and repeatability, science continues to move along providing real information about the real universe we inhabit.
This article may prove fruitful for discussion, but I would point you to a specific sentence where it is stated "for [Karl Popper, creator of the falsifiability criterion] the falsifiability criterion was not itself falsifiable." Now, I have not yet read
The Logic of Scientific Discovery in order to refute or verify this claim, but surely if we can rely on falsifiability which is itself not falsifiable, then some kinds of knowledge must be permissible and rational which are not themselves falsifiable. Or again, from the wikipedia article, which itself quotes Rafe Champion, "[Popper's] theory of conjectural knowledge does not even pretend to provide positively justified foundations of belief." It seems to me, then, that while falsifiability provides a largely useful guideline for scientific inquiry, falsifiable propositions by no means are the only propositions with meaning, assuming that the proposition "all evidence is falsifiable" is in any way meaningful.
Well, I was entirely prepared to argue to you that "there is at least one electron" is not falsifiable, but then someone pointed out to me that it is indeed falsifiable, but cannot be falsified on an inductive basis. Obviously, you cannot inductively look throughout the world and fail to find any electrons, and from this conclude that "there is at least one electron" is false. Let us, for the moment, define an electron as "a negatively charged particle significantly smaller in mass and equally and oppositely charged relative to a proton." You can, however, falsify it deductively: if, per impossible, it were determined that it is impossible for matter to be smaller in mass than a proton, then it "there is at least one electron" is falsified. So, my new contention is that "there is a God" can be similarly falsified. If you grant that it is a possibility that there are objective morals, then it is also
possible that the existence of evil (problem of evil) logically precludes the existence of God, defined as a perfectly good, perfectly powerful, and perfectly knowing being. This would make "there is a God," in principle, falsifiable.
You have propounded several variations of the "what if we're really, like, brains in a jar, man?" argument, which is indeed questioning the veracity of perception.
But obviously I do not hold to such a theory. I bring it up merely to point out that it is circular to define the veracity of perception with another perception, as below.
Furthermore, the veracity of perception is exceptionally simple to verify on the basis of observed phenomenon:
A species whose sense organs imparted false information about the universe it inhabits would not have made it far.
Allow me to state your argument this way:
1) If a species' sense organs impart false information, then it does not survive long.
2) Our species has survived long
3) Therefore our species' sense organs do not impart false information.
Not only does this argument commit the fallacy of affirming the consequent (although I remain open to the possibility that this is due to my off-the-cuff formalization of it, and would love to see it stated in a way that avoids this fallacy), but also this argument assumes that we accurately perceive both that our species "[has] made it far" and that creatures whose sense organs impart false information tend not to survive. The premises assume the conclusion. And if you argue that these premises have their origin in anything other than sense perception, then we already agree. This is the entire point of the argument: you cannot justify the veracity of perception with another perception. Thus, some other kind of knowledge must be necessary if we are going to continue to believe in the veracity of perception for any reason other than pragmatism.
Now, as for the "way out of the jar," Descartes provides only the option of a benevolent God as a means for securing of the reliability of perception. Sans God, there really is no certain or necessary foundation for the reliability of perception. Now, it's fine to still believe in perception without justification by God, as long as one will allow either that there is a measure of faith involved every time one assumes that the senses have not lead him astray, or the existence of self-evident truths and the inclusion of the reliability of perception within this category. Thus, it seems, we are indeed required to accept a measure of intuition rather than pure "ration" if for nothing other than to justify perception, unless we can deduce the existence of a benevolent and omnipotent agent to secure the reliability of our perception. And, surprisingly to myself, I do appear to have questioned "ration," although only accidentally. Darn it! I will perhaps need to concede sense perception as self-evident, then. Still, my point about the necessity of extra-falsifiable claims stands.
I will certainly concur that people who can provide literally zero hard evidence in support of their theories will find it difficult to enter into a productive debate with myself and people like me.
I would agree. As long as hard evidence means scientific evidence and intelligent design/the teleological argument is dismissed (I suppose I ought to try arguing it soon, though), I cannot see an effective means of debate. But I can try, right?
I have claimed, quite simply, that those who believe in God are unable to provide any evidence in support of this belief. So far, in 40-plus pages of exchange, no one has demonstrated this assertion to be false.
You are the one claiming the existence of something, not I. The burden of proof, good sir.
I have been busy providing evidence since I began writing: the ontological argument (which, yes, presumes that perfection is possible, at least in the Cartesian version), the cosmological argument (which is merely dependent upon proving the finitude of the universe, and can you prove that this is impossible to do?), and I've implied the moral argument (God as necessary for objective moral values). The fact that you define evidence as only including the scientific verification process does not make these arguments illogical.
I've made no ad hominem attacks. Your verbosity is a readily observable fact. If I'd said, "Silverchris is clearly a pantywaist and, accordingly, should not be taken seriously", that would have been an ad hominem attack. (Mind you, I don't know you well enough to make any such claims and don't intend to indicate that I consider you a pantywaist. I simply used this statement for illustrative purposes.)
On a somewhat related note, I think members of these forums should read up on what constitutes an ad hominem attack and a straw man fallacy before littering the terms about like so much wedding confetti.
Hmmm... you know what, you might be correct, at least from your perspective. Since you genuinely believe comments such as the pattern of theistic argument that you presented to be true, then such comments are not an attempt to prove my statements wrong by means of portraying me in a negative light. You believe that you are making a factual statement (heck, it might even be factual that this
has been your entire experience with theists, in which case I'm very sorry).
And I'm not by any means offended by the verbosity quip. I'll cop to that faster than I copped to argument from authority.