the state i am in
Active member
- Joined
- Feb 12, 2009
- Messages
- 2,475
- MBTI Type
- infj
- Enneagram
- 5w4
- Instinctual Variant
- sx/sp
statically ENFJ 2w1 are the second or third most common. while 1w2 ENFJ is rare,type 1 ENFJs make up about 3% of total ENFJ enneagram types.
this is my source.
for ENFJ:
Here Are The Most Common Enneagram Types For Each Myers-Briggs Personality Type | Page 15 | Thought Catalog
Here is what she says on the landing page of this collection of type correlations.
"It is important to indicate that the compiled data was entirely based on self-report. Participants were not required to obtain a professional assessment of their type or display an understanding of type theory, therefore a large margin of error must be taken into account when reviewing the results."
To me, it's better not to overlook this detail. The scientific community tends to have problems with typological thinking in part because it is so difficult to design experiments to validate it. In practice, it is easy to fall into fundamentalism. Meanwhile, we still have a level of observation problem, which means we aren't exactly sure how to directly observe the mechanisms of what we are hoping to observe. We are only observing contrasts in qualities of consciousness housed between people. We see these based on how people lead or specialize, and we try to deal with this problem with the idea of preferences. At the end of the day, however, we are imagining a complete human, essentialized human consciousness and then imagining the parts of that, or we are imagining specializations that we notice in comparison/contrasts between people. The first does better at lending itself to simple definition, but it runs into problems.
The idea that we could simply observe all the functions in ourselves is problematic. As qualities of consciousness, it seems to me that we don't actually observe the operations themselves. We might some day be able to, but it's like decoding a different order of a system, like how language processing works in the mind at a neural level. Right now, it's still a really tough story to meaningfully tell. We maybe focus on brain regions or brain structures, and then we play these confusing games abstracting brain structures that seem to do one thing but might work on a class of things in related ways.
If it's not a developmental story and it is one where we do not encounter a basic, structured and programmatic development plan, then type loses a lot of the logic of its internal order. At that point, its explanatory power becomes even less. Regardless, none of this gets us out of the difficulties of deciding how to talk about things in terms of spectrums vs discrete types that embody some kind of matrix with internally consistent logic of morphological or determinative features. Similarly, behavior abstracted to some kind of social biography might not contain a ton of useful information (and probably not super direct, at the very least). So, in the end, we are using mental models that are ultimately difficult to fully ground and substantiate, and they are difficult to turn into common ground and consistent containers/ideas when communicating.
I say all this having gained so much from learning my own version of these mental models. There's still lots of conflict and cognitive tension in thinking, communicating, contextualizing, or interacting with and through a typological lens, but I enjoy working on it with people who seem to help me make models that feel more useful. This can get really tricky when identities are at stake and when it seems quite possible that we don't have direct ways of encountering or experiencing or becoming aware of functions or motivations different than ours, except through the intense noise of lots of interacting, circumstantial, unique aspects happening all at once. Like the opposite of science, but nevertheless really important. More like perspective. More like context.
The idea that we could simply observe all the functions in ourselves is problematic. As qualities of consciousness, it seems to me that we don't actually observe the operations themselves. We might some day be able to, but it's like decoding a different order of a system, like how language processing works in the mind at a neural level. Right now, it's still a really tough story to meaningfully tell. We maybe focus on brain regions or brain structures, and then we play these confusing games abstracting brain structures that seem to do one thing but might work on a class of things in related ways.
If it's not a developmental story and it is one where we do not encounter a basic, structured and programmatic development plan, then type loses a lot of the logic of its internal order. At that point, its explanatory power becomes even less. Regardless, none of this gets us out of the difficulties of deciding how to talk about things in terms of spectrums vs discrete types that embody some kind of matrix with internally consistent logic of morphological or determinative features. Similarly, behavior abstracted to some kind of social biography might not contain a ton of useful information (and probably not super direct, at the very least). So, in the end, we are using mental models that are ultimately difficult to fully ground and substantiate, and they are difficult to turn into common ground and consistent containers/ideas when communicating.
I say all this having gained so much from learning my own version of these mental models. There's still lots of conflict and cognitive tension in thinking, communicating, contextualizing, or interacting with and through a typological lens, but I enjoy working on it with people who seem to help me make models that feel more useful. This can get really tricky when identities are at stake and when it seems quite possible that we don't have direct ways of encountering or experiencing or becoming aware of functions or motivations different than ours, except through the intense noise of lots of interacting, circumstantial, unique aspects happening all at once. Like the opposite of science, but nevertheless really important. More like perspective. More like context.
tldr: I don't believe that's useful knowledge or knowledge that I'd know enough about to adequately use it. Type is complicated. We aren't obligated to believe claims just because they are made or because someone in some way measured something, even if we are obligated to show respect to others and try to relate to what it's like to be a social animal who at times needs to make claims about oneself and one's own social identity (self in relation to others).
so your saying i`m 1w2? because i didn`t quite understand the sentence.
I assume that with typology, we are trying to disambiguate. To use constraints to narrow our sense of type.
With primary vs secondary/wing, I've noticed that primary seems to be visible earlier developmentally. For myself and many people I know, it seems like the wing kicks in around 18-22. It seems like primary starts kicking in around puberty.
From what I've observed, this is more useful than tallying features of all types without any context. It seems like a useful tool to explore best fit. It seems like a leading theory to me that is generally better than the other theories. It is weird though. Part of what makes it good is that it resolves cognitive tension. Definitely a slippery slope.
In the meantime, I have no idea of your type. I was just suggesting that might be an interesting place to look when disambiguating 1w2 vs 2w1. In my own personal correlations matrix, I put ENFJ at 1w2 and 3w4. So far, I haven't observed someone who I thought seemed best fit at ENFJ who was a different enneagram type. I think some of the differences that destablize the fit are based on instinctual subtypes, which I also think are narrowed from all possibilities into specific correlations. There could also definitely be dimensions of personality we don't quite recognize or haven't quite ordered yet in our models.