[Jungian Cognitive Functions] Introversion, Extraversion, the MBTI and the IIEE/EEII stacks.

[GavinElster]

and, let's not forget Jung pegs Charles Darwin as an example of Extraverted Thinking, despite Darwin being one of the most influential introverts of all time.
General 'I/E' dichotomy stereotypes etc need not apply, from a Jungian perspective imo - as it's not necessarily to do with how one acts or behaves but rather whether they are ordinarily oriented towards objective data (e) or subjective data (i).

I don't see any reason why someone that is oriented towards their own subjective data (i) couldn't be overly "extraverted" in the stereotypical sense, whereas someone that is oriented towards objective data (e) couldn't be overly "introverted" in the stereotypical sense.

You're absolutely right that there's no reason those things are incompatible, and I personally think you're right this is why Jung apparently typed some people who would be Big 5 introverts as extraverts. And Darwin is probably a good example. I'm not aware of his personal life, but I could easily imagine he's a 'standard' introvert.

However, this was one of those places where, if we wanted to be really clear on what Jung *wrote*, it's clear he attributed the social-introversion/social-extraversion to his own version of introversion/extraversion. It just seems if you read between the lines at what he did in practice in typing people, it seems to me he might have been happy, at least in some telling and important cases, to ignore his own words on extraverts and sociability and focus on some of the external vs archetypes stuff.

I think this reminds me a little of how in principle Jung makes a fuss that there's just one conscious function, but he seems to in practice override that in favor of a IIEE/EEII framework, by regarding the aux as frequently conscious.


I obviously think there are reasonable definitions of 'oriented towards the outside' vs 'oriented to the subjective factor' where you can satisfy the definition without satisfying the corresponding big 5 version, and just think we have to note that Jung didn't do justice to the separation between those things.

 

[Jaguar]

There Is No Such Thing as an Introvert or Extrovert
We are compilations of tendencies, patterns, and energies.

While Jung is famous for saying no one is a pure introvert or pure extrovert, I will go beyond this to say there is no such thing as an introvert (or an extrovert). Most of us have a healthy mix of both introvert and extrovert tendencies with one set predominating overall or in particular circumstances, such as how we are at work. Even for those of us farther out on the continuum, where introversion predominates in a much more pervasive way, there is still no such thing as an introvert.

There Is No Such Thing as an Introvert or Extrovert | Psychology Today

 

[GavinElster]

While Jung is famous for saying no one is a pure introvert or pure extrovert, I will go beyond this to say there is no such thing as an introvert (or an extrovert). Most of us have a healthy mix of both introvert and extrovert tendencies with one set predominating overall or in particular circumstances, such as how we are at work. Even for those of us farther out on the continuum, where introversion predominates in a much more pervasive way, there is still no such thing as an introvert.

I think Jung's definition of introvert is the bolded. That is, he already seems to think anyone, including an introvert, has a combination of introverted and extraverted tendencies.

I think this article's message only makes sense from some very esoteric Buddhist point of view, like if you view the self as a silly concept. This seems evidenced here

Thing implies noun. Introverts and extroverts alike are not nouns but verbs. Humans are always in a process of becoming; our thingness is an illusion.

The basic idea behind this is likely just that 'you' change all the time, so there is no single 'you' as a static entity. So it's better to consider introversion the process, and to say there's no 'Self' called an introvert behind it.

I think ultimately it's better to be deflationary about such things until one is really on board with the rest of Buddhist philosophy and somehow metaphysically committed to the no-Self theory in a strong way, and say I can just as well define the introvert/person/Self to BE the process for the purpose of discussion of personality psychology . That way it is a noun, and it is characterized by a predominance of introverting in the verb sense.

Notice I'm still taking the article seriously, in that I'm saying how you can consider an "introvert" without committing to a Self, i.e. precisely what is happening when someone defines an introvert to correspond to the predominance of introversion.

 

[Turi]

No one's pissing on your thread. reckful with his emphatic presentations has made knocking the Grant model into some sort of fad (just like mixing Socionics and other stuff has become a fad), so you and a few others have jumped on the bandwagon spouting parts of his arguments, but putting your own spin on them (like you partly accept functions where he completely rejects them), but it doesn't matter, just as long as Grant is trashed. And now your harping point is how much of "the book" I've read, but I've told you it's not about being 100% faithful to Jung, because he was all over the place (what Gavin just said made a good point), and you two have read the book, but were shown to have possibly misread things, and others who have read the book, including genuine Jungian experts who have far more credential than you, still accept Grant's model. They're not just being stupid or something, there's a reason Grant's model has stuck.
So preferences are not realistic? Only extreme? Then why do so many people identify with them? So we're really all or mostly total ambiverts? And what is a "pure form? Is it either "pure" and if you're not "pure" you're a total ambivert, or are there graduated scales inbetween, that are still preferences?

You want to deconstruct the model most accept here, yet you're not even clear on what you want to replace it with. You're the ones doing something with no reason; rebels without a cause!

I don't care for 'trashing Grant', I care about the truth being expressed, and expressing the Grant stack as "JCF" is not the truth - that's the extent of my care factor here.
I'm not interested in 'trashing Grant' - there's no need for that, I'll just assume you haven't read Grant and friends book either - in the book, he trashes himself anyway - he states the whole IEIE/EIEI thing is no more than a plausible hypothesis and notes that if it doesn't work for you, just ignore it as it's not what the book is about anyway.

Grant himself didn't take a firm stance behind the IEIE/EIEI stack. He just thought it kinda made sense, seemed to be reflected in the completely non-scientific studies and research he did, and that was that.

Most people are indeed "ambiverts", everybody leans one way or another - towards I/E, even if it's literally a 51-49 ratio, though - so "true" ambiversion, assuming that's 50/50 is a no deal. But if we're considering ambiversion to reflect say, being within X amount of the middle - then yes, this is true to Jung.
Re: a 'pure' form, this means complete introversion with absolutely no extraversion mechanism - this doesn't exist. The two have to work together, regardless of how much a person prefers introversion.


As for replacing it - well the idea of this thread wasn't to hawk my preferred model, it was simply to raise awareness of the fact that the IEIE/EIEI stack everyone loves and attempts to force onto people, is not true to Jung.
Since you've asked - the model I prefer, and have been preferring for months now - is ObjectivePersonality - it allows for both IIEE/EEII and IEIE/EIEI stacks, incorporates many other aspects of personality theory and most importantly, to me, is producing consistent results among people with regards to typing others - so it's actually producing objective (or, intersubjective depending on how semantic you are) results.

 

[Eric B]

It looks like the four days of posts lost when the site went down aren't coming back because they weren't backed up.

So I might as well just do a summary of the whole debate:

I've been defending the "Grant model" of function stacks from what appeared to be constant attacks against it, but beginning with this last remaining post (above), and then even reckful, eventually, right before the shutdown, I've been accused of misunderstanding their motives; they're not really trashing Grant for "not being true to Jung", for after all, Myers differed from Jung (who did teach functions, and one person is advocating something that's supposed to be the original, "true" Myers model of dichotomies, and the other is advocating another model that uses functions, but allows for both the Grant and Gray-Wheelwright stackings [where the dominant and aux. are the same attitude]. This latter one didn't become more clear until later, when the name of the theory, "ObjectivePersonality" was finally mentioned).

Yet the issue keeps being brought up in order to "correct people" who follow "the HaroldGrantians" and associate the Grant model with Jung or MBTI. (I note the "us vs them" language resembling some sort of religious or political debate. Grant BTW, you hardly heard of, until these debates here, where he was essentially “isolated” as the source of the common function stack used).

I point out that people may loosely refer to the model as "JCF", but I don't see anyone denying there's any difference. But then, it's implied that's not the real issue. Perhaps it's people supposedly saying "Jungian/MBTI type is basically all about the functions", or that Myers was simply Jung "simplified".
So what, really? People say all sorts of things. And the functions seem to explain things to them (fit their experience), so they see it as "all about" them, where a bunch of impersonal numbers is meaningless to them (more on this point below).
It's also supposedly not about James Reynierse, yet his name and article "The Case AGAINST Function Dynamics" is the main source cited, by everyone arguing against the Grant model.

It's all about "following the data", and dichotomies are the only thing "supported by the data". So then it is acnowledged "Myers-Briggs typology is basically where Jung's typology ended up after it was very substantially modified — not to mention expanded — to fit the evidence." So then, functions are simply "bunk" people later picked up on because they were "drunk" or thought dichotomies were "boring", different people have claimed.

But then, what's the point then (in repeating this stuff over and over)? No one here is saying functions have the same data as the dichotomies (regardless of how much they may "conflate" the models). Also, it's not some scientific forum that only follows and discusses what's supported by "statistics". And all the arguing in the world won't make it so.

But they only do the statistical data with the established MBTI dichotomies, so then any other factors remain "unsupported". It's like a presupposition. We even see "the reason they've barely been studied is that, unlike the dichotomies, they've never been taken seriously by any significant number of academic psychologists." Why not? Would it be because they've "barely been studied" (i.e. verified by the data of the studies, which is the whole case against them being taken seriously) to begin with? Does anyone see a tautology there?

It should be pointed out that typology altogether (including the MBTI) still isn't "taken seriously by any significant number of academic psychologists". The only thing that is, is FFM.
So from there, another old debate surfaced between two others as to whether MBTI itself really has enough data support to begin with. The larger psychology field seems to think it doesn't. FFM is what they support. (And this ambivalence around statistical "data" is one reason I don't rely on it. It can be selectively cited or accepted, or misinterpreted. Sorry, but it's not infallible. It's still subject to the human factor).

So I note that it seems we're trying to compete with FFM (such as others adding "Assertive/Turbulent", which is supposed to be the missing fifth factor corresponding to Neuroticism), and thus, apparently, this whole Reyniersian push for dichotomies only, supported by "data".

So the evidence that the auxiliary function is opposite in attitude from the dominant, or that functions exist at all, or that ESTJ's and INFP's have something in common, seems to end up purely anecdotal (like they both process logical objectively, and express having an aversion to a more subjectively determined logic, plus the fact that my thinking and theirs in this issue clearly differ along these same lines, just as predicted by function-attitude theory)*, and this is rejected in favor of statistical numbers (which are based on people who are just as prone to mistyping as anyone else).
*These debates, to repeat, are the clearest illustrations of the differences —and conflicts between an extraverted and introverted Thinking perspective. It's not just “J-orderly approach to learning vs P- lax approach”; that dichotomy clearly points to a difference in the “thinking” itself. To the point I'm sure that my opponents think my not “going with the facts” is basically a LACK of “thinking” (logic) altogether (RIGHT?), and in turn, I see letting stuff like some page of numbers “do all the thinking for you” (i.e. determine what is "truth" or "fact" to begin with) in the same way! But we're not producing a formal study from it, so it for all purposes isn't real; it basically doesn't exist.

So I want to apologize to Turin for dragging this thread down this path. But I saw the Grant model being criticized yet again, as it has been now for several years, and felt it needed a defense sometimes. Just because it doesn't have the same level of statistics doesn't mean it needs to have everyone steered away from it, or whatever the aim is.

But in any case, the functions are another "angle" of typology, that deal with how we split reality. This split is what gives "opposites" something in common, because whatever we suppress from consciousness is compensated in the unconscious, where it "collects" and forms an "image" of the opposite preference.
But then this is all abstract, and thus probably hard to really verify through a purely concrete scientific method. (So we might as well reject all of typology and say an S/N difference is bunk, for what we call the concrete "S" perspective is the RIGHT one, and any abstract "N" perspective is just "head-in-the-clouds" fantasy or something).

To repeat the point made so well by Drenth:

Beyond Scientific: The Case for Jungian / Myers-Briggs Typology

The first problem, is that studying human beings, including consciousness in general, is apt to require a different tools and methods than those employed in the physical sciences. To conceive and approach human beings as a mere set of physical processes (i.e., reductionism) will undoubtedly result in a failure to understand the things we cherish most about human life, namely, its qualitative elements.

Second, when critics limit truth to only a narrow version of empirical science, they fail to give credence to our everyday experiences of truth and meaning, including that derived from the arts and humanities. Can we not find truth in art, fiction, music, or religion? When these things resonate with us deeply, we often use terms such as “true” or “real” to describe them. Thus, there are at least two ways we determine truth: through science / intellect and through experience. These dual modes of knowing are nicely illustrated in Seymour Epstein’s Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST), as well as in the vast body of research enumerating left vs. right brain differences.

I love Perrin’s notion that something is beautiful when “its characteristics are all appropriate to its purpose.” This is why, when evaluating a theory like Jungian typology, we are behooved to first consider its purpose—what it aims to accomplish and what we expect from it.

Of course, we can’t really measure elegance in the same way we can measure something like the speed of light. This is because elegance is in large part assessed holistically or qualitatively rather than quantitatively; in many respects, we “know it when we see it.” It is through this sort of qualitative assessment that we have come to recognize, among other things, great works of art and literature.

As for the ObjectivePersonality site, it's interesting, and seems to rename a lot of stuff in the familiar models (in addition to adding the XXYY stack, with such types called "jumpers" if I read correctly) but otherwise makes sense. Turi did an analysis of my type using its steps, and I could identify with it; especially the "issues around Fe" or something like that. Since I believe it's the complexes (of Beebe's model) that set the stack, then a "jumper" would simply be someone whose tertiary seems stronger than the auxiliary. When activated, the associated complex with "inflate" itself, and if something is causing this to happen a lot, it may seem to be the auxiliary. To me, the term "jump" even goes along with this. Like I might at times seem like TiSi. But I know Ne is the truly preferred function (and thus what holds the dichotomy position. And not Ni either).

But it seems a jumper is seen as a permanent variation of type (creating a total of 32), and he seems to disagree with the site as to whether TiNi is a variation of ISTP or INTP, if I remember correctly. If ISTP, then that's congruent with what I would believe, and we'd only differ as to which is really the auxiliary or tertiary. If INTP, then that would partly go along with a dichotomy approach, because all that really matters is that I, N and T are preferred.
I also asked if this theory addresses the four "shadow" functions.

 

[GavinElster]

But then, what's the point then (in repeating this stuff over and over)? No one here is saying functions have the same data as the dichotomies (regardless of how much they may "conflate" the models). Also, it's not some scientific forum that only follows and discusses what's supported by "statistics". And all the arguing in the world won't make it so.

But they only do the statistical data with the established MBTI dichotomies, so then any other factors remain "unsupported". It's like a presupposition. We even see "the reason they've barely been studied is that, unlike the dichotomies, they've never been taken seriously by any significant number of academic psychologists." Why not? Would it be because they've "barely been studied" (i.e. verified by the data of the studies, which is the whole case against them being taken seriously) to begin with? Does anyone see a tautology there?

OK, glad someone started this instead of me -- I was confused about the posts being lost, too!

Anyway, Eric, here's my remark here that might possibly help: I think there are two issues here. One is whether to use non-statistically-based discussion of personality at all. The other is just getting clear what the relation between the statistically based stuff and the non-statistically based stuff is.

I believe one aim (not saying it is the only one) that both Turi and reckful (as i understand them) seem to have in common is to point out (and this corresponds to issue 2 above), whether or not you use a functions theory or talk about it, there seems to be no support for the idea of a robust association between Grant-functions-theory and the statistical side of the MBTI, which is after all what the test ultimately spits out.

Now (again as I understand them), I think BOTH Turi and reckful ALSO have slants in line with issue 1 and towards favoring what each considers to be a more scientifically respectable perspective -- though not the exact same slant. Turi seems more willing to just explore functions theory -- to some extent just to set straight what Jung thought, and to another extent to even figure out if there's a version of it that really 'works' in real life.

I think it's reasonable for someone to be disinterested in not data-driven versions of personality theory, as long as the only thing they forcefully seek to wipe out isn't people talking about said versions but rather the idea that the non-data-driven ones actually correspond accurately to the data-driven-ones.


And, to reiterate my perspective on the non-data-driven stuff, I think the valid use for that is in the logic/definitions sense. I refuse to endorse an 'it works' approach to functions theory, because I think "it works" seems to require a modicum of pragmatism and data-drivenness to support. I think it is fair to describe how someone is justifying their thought processes, and the tensions inherent to that (which is already complex) in a logic/language/definitions sense. Heck, as I often point out, where did the words describing people in the lexical analysis done by the Big 5 even come from? Definitions! Language! At some point, people had to use the word 'friendly' .... and THEN it became recognized as a part of a statistical factor of personality involving lots of intercorrelations among personality descriptors.

Some patterns are much more complex than traditional dictionary terms. They may require elaborate description, and definition, and philosophizing. Used in this sense, I see completely no problem to a less data driven side to personality.

I've heard experts in the AI community suggest that you can't really understand how the brain thinks merely by analyzing it mechanically as an organ, because almost any collection of particles could behave intelligently, presumably, and you need to guess the patterns involved -- simply defining those patterns precisely helps. There's always, IMHO, going to be a more conceptual side to cognitive science and psychology.

However, when you claim X TENDS TO go with Y, that's a claim there should be some tests for that are of an empirical nature. There you're not just invoking definitions. And the hearsay inference from personal observations is definitely, here, inferior to larger scale tests.

To put it another way,

But then this is all abstract, and thus probably hard to really verify through a purely concrete scientific method

if it is abstract, then it should not involve concrete claims, like REAL, LIVE people actually tend to do X over Y. Otherwise, it is a mix of abstract and concrete. Abstract, to me, is like pure logic, with no empirical claims whatsoever, or like pure abstract art, which just an intuitive meaning, and again no factual claims.

The real reason we're screwed here is we don't understand how the human brain really works, so any somewhat elaborate claim about how thinking works is doomed in terms of the data.

 

[GavinElster]

Besides that, my most on-topic contribution to this thread is that I think, regardless of whether we think Grant is the best model or the dichotomies, it isn't bad to have some clarification of what Jung thought.

And it is my understanding that Jung non-controversially seems to make two conflicting claims: that only the dom can be conscious, and that the dom/aux are both conscious functions. He also types Nietzsche as both an introverted intuitive and an introverted thinking type. Given that, in his typology, the notion of an introverted function isn't separated from the combination of introversion+having the function, I can only surmise the typing of Nietzsche is further support for the idea that the auxiliary can be regarded as conscious.

MY best interpretation as to resolving the conflicting claims is, perhaps Jung thought only dom=conscious in the sense of it possessing absolute sovereingty, or in other words, Jung had the idea of one function operating true to its own principle, so my understanding is the aux cannot operate not-subordinate to the dom's principle. In THIS sense of conscious = absolutely not relative to any other principle, only one is conscious.

In the OTHER use of conscious, i.e. more conscious than not, it seems Jung thinks the aux is probably conscious. This other use is what Jung uses to type someone as an introvert: MORE influenced by the subjective factor than the facts.

Keep in mind this second one doesn't necessarily conflict with the first, because even if it suggests someone who is a thinking dominant can be more or less prioritizing of thinking over sensation, if sensation is auxiliary, that doesn't mean that in either case, sensation ever operates true to its own principle: the perceiving is always good only in so much as it supports the judging. It's just some may have a larger degree of perceiving supporting the judging. Whereas others may be more just-judging without finding a way to fuse the aims of sensation with those of thinking, say.
I feel like this is what he's getting at, and my support is really from the text that Jung seems to mention this whole absolute sovereignty/priority of clear aims as support for why only one function can be deemed conscious.



Now, and here I'm afraid I may be playing into [MENTION=18736]reckful[/MENTION]'s point, it seems like there is a slant to the latter use of conscious because it's the one Jung usually uses. This use of 'absolute sovereignty' seems somewhat more esoteric. And it seems a bit safe to say this 'more than not' fits with a dichotomies/Big 5 flavor more.

I'm not sure if he would agree with my attempted (speculative, mind you) resolution of the apparent contradictory use of "conscious function", but that's my best shot right now. But either way, agreed or not, were it right, I think it would kind of go with reckful's general slant that Jung's use of functions theory seems to be more dichotomies-friendly and that Grant just goes way farther the other direction.


(I'm actually kinda curious, Mr. Reckful, what you DO think Jung was getting at by the two uses of 'conscious' i.e. one suggesting only one function is conscious, and the other that two can be...if I've already asked this, I'm unfortunately forgetting about it.)

 

[reckful]

Here's the first of my "lost posts" from this thread:

======================================

So you favor dichotomies only, which you've clearly asserted in places.
I said “unclear” because it all revolves around this premise of Jungian “purism” which on one hand argues for an IIEE stack (the Gray-Wheelwright interpretation), and now, that he really said most people are ambiverts, I/E preferences are “extremities” (which would knock out both functions AND dichotomies; let alone having both dominant and auxiliary functions the same attitude [MENTION=33869]Turi[/MENTION] that's would make people all the more introverted or extraverted, not ambiverted), etc.

One of the dichotomies is J/P, which was defined by Myers in terms of functions: which one is extraverted. If you're going to say “the real“ model makes that a dichotomy only, then it's already diverged from Jung, because his fourth factor was “rational/irrational“, which referred to the dominant preference.
Then, this is supposed to be “The Real“ Myers-Briggs model, but you acknowledge in there where she strays from Jung.

It's like the both of you are using Jung just enough to play against the IEIE model, but once you've knocked that out of the way, then you deviate from a pure Jungian teaching yourselves. So it's not really about being faithful to Jung, it's about one particular person's version of the theory.

You're basically following one person in particular; Reynierse, and I don't knock him, but this is just another interpretation of Jung, which also deviates from him, and most don't see it his way. Oh, but they were all just “drunk” I see on there. (Which pretty much answers one of my other “questions” in the above post). That's a fine way to prove one's case.

Looking up Reynierse again, it's hard to even find any info on him, other than him publishing that one CAPT journal paper ('09), and he had another one from '97. Otherwise, all the other search links (that are not others of the same name); it just you and others enthusiastically promoting him in forums.
While it is possible for one person to pick up on something others have missed, should we be so quick to put so much stock behind some single writer like this in a field of peers, who don't seem to recognize him, and then conclude everyone else was just "drunk"? That's bad enough in political discourse. If he's the end all and the be all, why isn't he recognized somewhere?

And we shouldn't forget, it's not even like the common model rejects dichotomies. If that were the case, then this crusade would make more sense. As I keep saying over and over, dichotomies and functions are just two different ways of looking at the same thing. You yourself said what's called Se is just S+P. No one denies that.
I just do not understand the reason for this black and white thinking, that treats this like tangible objects or laws like gravity, where it either is, or it isn't. Typology models are abstract, and thus malleable.
Re "just the truth of JCF" vs Grant; When people speak of "JCF", again, no one said it was identical to everything Jung taught; it means it's based on his "eight types"
All of this is what's creating more “confusion”. It's true that MBTI typology is being diluted away as everyone adds Socionics, Enneagram, Assertive/Turbulent, etc. but what you're doing is just adding more to the mix, and basically finishing the job.

Thanks for reading my posts with such care, Eric — as you always do.

I don't believe in "following" Jung, or Myers, or Reynierse, or any other authority — and neither did Jung, Myers or Reynierse.

I believe in following the data. And as Reynierse has rightly pointed out, the Real MBTI Model is the model supported by the data. And by contrast, there is nothing that "type dynamics" adds to the Real MBTI Model that has any respectable amount of evidence behind it.

And as further explained in the spoiler in this post, the Real MBTI Model was essentially Myers' model. It's not a Reynierse innovation, or a reckful innovation. And Myers arrived at that model by going where the data took her.

Maybe someday you'll believe in following the data, too, Eric, and you'll stop pretending that INFPs and ESTJs (for example) have any MBTI-related aspects of personality in common.

I've lost count of how many times you've posted that "dichotomies and functions are just two different ways of looking at the same thing." As I've pointed out to you multiple times, either INFPs and ESTJs have substantial aspects of MBTI-related personality in common or they don't. And for you to say that the Real MBTI Model and the HaroldGrantian "function axes" model don't conflict is ridiculous.

And not only do they conflict, but with all due respect, it's time to declare Harold Grant the loser. Because as I've pointed out to you before, over 50 years of MBTI data pools, correlating the types with everything under the sun, have demonstrated that if whatever you're correlating with MBTI type is something where the INFPs are notably out toward one end of the correlational spectrum, you can reliably expect to find the ESTJs out toward the other end. To which somebody who's been bamboozled by the HaroldGrantians might exclaim, "WTF?!" Where, they might wonder, are the data pools where the questionnaire item or behavioral trait or whatever else is being measured is mainly an "Ne" thing, or an "Si" thing, or an "Fi" thing, or a "Te" thing, and the INFPs and ESTJs are on one side of the spectrum, and the INFJs and ESTPs (both supposedly "Fe/Ti" and "Ni/Se" types) are on the other side? And if that's what they're wondering, reckful is here to tell them that those data pools are on the same island where they keep the unicorns and the munchkins.

The notion that an INFP has "tertiary Si," and will therefore tend (probabilistically speaking) to have "Si" aspects of personality in common with a typical ISTJ that ISTPs tend not to exhibit, is a typological assertion that — like all assertions that crosscut the dichotomies in that counterintuitive way — has no more validity than the notion that two people born at around the same time will tend to have aspects of personality in common because they're both Capricorns.

And yeah, I know you've heard that all before. But apparently you keep forgetting.

 

[reckful]

A-a-and here's the next substantive "lost" post in my exchange with Eric B:

==========================================

This is just one man's study and interpretation of Jung, and it seems no one has even recognized him. I'm not one who usually favors "consensus", but I'm sure there's a reason why, other than everyone in the entire MBTI field being "drunk", or "bored" with dichotomies. It seems the entire field is looking for ways to be competitive with the more recognized FFM model, and if they saw Reynierse's solution as the way to do that, they would have jumped on.

Again, no one is saying the Grant model is 100% true to Jung, even if they call it "JCF", and I know I certainly didn't when discussing the Intentional styles, so this whole Reynierse Revolution of attacking the Grant model at every turn, in the name of trying to "correct" everyone on "Jung", is barking up the wrong tree to begin with.

For someone who purports to be criticizing my posts, you really seem to lack the most cursory understanding of what they're about.

The most important thing that Reynierse is pointing out — correctly, as a factual matter — is that there isn't a single aspect of "type dynamics" that differs from (or goes beyond) what I call the Real MBTI model and that has found any respectable level of evidentiary support. In anybody's studies.

It's not about "one man's study and interpretation of Jung."

As another example, my problem with the Grant stack isn't that it isn't "100% true to Jung." Are you kidding me? As I'm forever pointing out, Myers departed from Jung in many ways, to bring his original concepts in line with the data she'd gathered from thousands of subjects. And that was a good thing, and I approve wholeheartedly.

When HaroldGrantians and others hold up evidence-challenged offshoots of the MBTI and incorrectly claim that they reflect Jung's model — presumably as a way of trying to improve their pedigree — I don't hesitate to correct them, and I think Jung's worth talking about, for various reasons. But the fact that those models don't match Jung isn't what's ultimately wrong with them.

And I don't know if it's your reading comprehension skills or your integrity (or both) that need a serious upgrade, Eric, but for you to purport to argue with me and Reynierse by claiming that what we're about is trying to bring "the Grant model" in line with Jung seems to me to reflect a jaw-dropping level of, as I say, either obtuseness or dishonesty (or both). And either way, it's disrespectful. And either way, you're misleading your fellow forumites, and wasting their time. And either way, you really ought to up your standards.

 

[reckful]

And here's the next (and last) post I made in that exchange:

=======================================

You talk endlessly about these "HaroldGrantians" claiming his model "reflects Jung's model", but are you reading too much into "reflect"? Are they saying it is 100% in line with Jung? If not, then what is the problem? And I didn't say you were tying to being it in line with Jung, but rather it seemed you were trying to eradicate it altogether. Mention tandems somewhere, and then here you come! So now, you're only trying to "correct" someone saying Grant's model "reflects" Jung?

As "reflected" in the posts I've made in many, many fruitless exchanges with you, Eric (including the last post I addressed to you in this very thread), neither Reynierse's main complaint with the HaroldGrantians, nor mine, has anything to do with the extent to which the Grant model "reflects" Jung.

Reynierse characterizes the cognitive functions as a "category mistake," Eric. That's a point it would be hard to miss if you read his article with any care, and it's a characterization that I've specifically quoted in post after post after post.

A man who views the eight functions as a "category mistake" is clearly not a man who's offering the world a model that he claims is an "interpretation of Jung," or a man who thinks other people's models should be criticized for being inconsistent with Jung.

The main problem with the Grant function stack has nothing to do with whether its proponents claim it's "100% in line with Jung," or 90%, or 80%, or 50%, or 10%.

"Then what is the problem?" you ask.

The problem, as I've pointed out to you many times, including in this very thread, is this:

Over 50 years of MBTI data pools, correlating the types with everything under the sun, have demonstrated that if whatever you're correlating with MBTI type is something where the INFPs are notably out toward one end of the correlational spectrum, you can reliably expect to find the ESTJs out toward the other end. To which somebody who's been bamboozled by the HaroldGrantians might exclaim, "WTF?!" Where, they might wonder, are the data pools where the questionnaire item or behavioral trait or whatever else is being measured is mainly an "Ne" thing, or an "Si" thing, or an "Fi" thing, or a "Te" thing, and the INFPs and ESTJs are on one side of the spectrum, and the INFJs and ESTPs (both supposedly "Fe/Ti" and "Ni/Se" types) are on the other side? And if that's what they're wondering, reckful is here to tell them that those data pools are on the same island where they keep the unicorns and the munchkins.

The notion that an INFP has "tertiary Si," and will therefore tend (probabilistically speaking) to have "Si" aspects of personality in common with a typical ISTJ that ISTPs tend not to exhibit, is a typological assertion that — like all assertions that crosscut the dichotomies in that counterintuitive way — has no more validity than the notion that two people born at around the same time will tend to have aspects of personality in common because they're both Capricorns.​

The main problem with INFP=Fi-Ne-Si-Te isn't that it's inconsistent with Jung, or that it's inconsistent with Myers, or that it's never been endorsed by the official MBTI folks — although all of those things are true.

The main problem is that the notion that FPs and TJs have "Fi" and "Te" things in common has no more validity than the zodiac.

 

[reckful]

And it is my understanding that Jung non-controversially seems to make two conflicting claims: that only the dom can be conscious, and that the dom/aux are both conscious functions. ...

(I'm actually kinda curious, Mr. Reckful, what you DO think Jung was getting at by the two uses of 'conscious' i.e. one suggesting only one function is conscious, and the other that two can be...if I've already asked this, I'm unfortunately forgetting about it.)

If you're talking about the section on the auxiliary function in Chapter X, Jung clearly refers to the dom and aux (in that same section) as the two "conscious functions," so that pretty much forces us, it seems to me, to interpret his earlier reference to one function alone having "sovereignty" to mean that it's possible for a function to be essentially conscious (so it's properly referred to as a "conscious function") without having that one-function "sovereignty." As Jung further explains: "This other function, therefore, can have only a secondary importance, as has been found to be the case in practice."

And when I say that Jung's description of the auxiliary, taken as a whole, "forces us" to interpret the earlier "sovereignty" stuff in the way I'm suggesting, I think "forces us" is appropriate in this case because I can't think of any reasonable-range alternative interpretation of that section that reconciles the one function language earlier in the section with the two conscious functions language at the end. Can you?

Also, as a reminder: in 1952, in Individual Dream Symbolism in Relation to Alchemy, Jung re-described the consciousness/unconsciousness aspects of his four functions like this:

If we think of the psychological function [sic] as arranged in a circle, then the most differentiated function is usually the carrier of the ego and, equally regularly, has an auxiliary function attached to it. The "inferior" function, on the other hand, is unconscious and for that reason is projected into a non-ego. It too has an auxiliary function. ...

In the psychology of the functions there are two conscious and therefore masculine functions, the differentiated function and its auxiliary, which are represented in dreams by, say, father and son, whereas the unconscious functions appear as mother and daughter. Since the conflict between the two auxiliary functions is not nearly as great as that between the differentiated and the inferior function, it is possible for the third function — that is, the unconscious auxiliary one — to be raised to consciousness and thus made masculine. It will, however, bring with it traces of its contamination with the inferior function, thus acting as a kind of link with the darkness of the unconscious.​

 

[GavinElster]

that pretty much forces us, it seems to me, to interpret his earlier reference to one function alone having "sovereignty" to mean that it's possible for a function to be essentially conscious (so it's properly referred to as a "conscious function") without having that one-function "sovereignty."

Sure -- it's definitely clear that he thinks a function can be essentially conscious without its having sovereignty. Where I take essentially conscious to mean, in parallel to Jung's use of 'relatively unconscious,' that we're talking more conscious than not.

What always bugs me is

The products of all the functions can be conscious, but we speak of the consciousness of a function only when not merely its application is at the disposal of the will, but when at the same time its principle is decisive for the orientation of consciousness. The latter event is true when, for instance, thinking is not a mere esprit de l'escalier, or rumination, but when its decisions possess an absolute validity, so that the logical conclusion in a given case holds good, whether as motive or as guarantee of practical action, without the backing of any further evidence. This absolute sovereignty always belongs, empirically, to one function alone, and can belong only to one function, since the equally independent intervention of another function would necessarily yield a different orientation, which would at least partially contradict the first.

Basically, Jung seems to be saying you can ultimately only speak of the consciousness of one function, not two.

Directly, that just seems to be two contradictory uses of 'conscious function'....so what it makes me wonder is if one definition is conscious = possesses absolute sovereignty, what on earth does the absolute sovereignty mean, as distinguished from the version of consciousness that's attributed to two functions?
The only guess I could come up with is that Jung means this has a lot to do with the concept of differentiating a function -- that is, that an intuitive-dom is the only one who intuits for the sake of intuiting, so to speak. I.e. the principle of intuition (seeking possibilities) is a kind of aim in itself rather than one fused with that of something else (e.g. in the sense of merely being support for another principle).

That's step 1 -- defining absolute sovereignty -- there, I think there's some support for my reading. And it's clear usage1 of consciousness of a function is this. Step 2 for me is figuring out why Jung thinks one definition of the consciousness of a function = having absolute sovereignty.
How does that fit in with/differ from his other usage of "conscious functions" later on? This Step 2 is what I'm very confused by.

It seems to me this is part of the tension of having the irrational-rational dichotomy be the ONE case where it's not straightforwardly a one-is-conscious/the-other-is-unconscious situation (whereas it is for introversion/extraversion). The interpretation where one is conscious/other isn't seems to correspond to this absolute sovereignty, where in a sense, you're just establishing that rational does in fact suppress irrational/vice versa. The interpretation where both are conscious corresponds to there being no contradiction between the two.

I have imagined what's going on (again, my speculation as to what Jung would say if I could shake him!) is something like this: there's no limit to how much you can deploy intuition in service of thinking, because no matter how far you try to be intuitive, i.e. almost identical to an intuitive dom's 'use' of the function, there's always a way it can serve thinking without contradicting it. However, you won't ever deploy it for its own sake. Something like near-identical use while the attitude/intention behind the use differing.

However, is there anything more direct Jung says about why consciousness of a function requires absolute sovereignty?

And thanks for the other reference where two conscious functions are referenced. That goes to support that it was pretty mainstream (which only makes sense given Nietzsche's typing).

 

[Eric B]

[MENTION=18736]reckful[/MENTION] You reposted two comments; one that had not been deleted, where you accuse me of not reading you right. Did you see the above post where I reopened the discussion after the shutdown, and addressed this?

I should point out, that when you make so many of these long, long posts; and not only that, but in them, link to numerous previous long posts spanning years, all saying the same exact things, and having all of these different arguments packed together, including what Reynierse said, what Jung said, what Myers said, what statistics there are or aren't, and always concluding how functions and the Grant stack are like the Zodiac, then you should see that it's quite easy to lose what exactly your point is (rather than all of that making it more clear). You've been a bit more clear on what you are “against”, than what exactly you were “for”. It got lost amidst all the anti-Grant or “HaroldGrantians” rhetoric. Even someone more on your side like Gavin seems to still be left with questions about it. (Your writing is actually a lot like Jung in this regard). My posts can be long and drawn out, and so I've had to learn this myself.
So it does look like you're just trying to bash the Grant model because it doesn't fit Jung and Myers perfectly, in addition to not having the statistical support.

So I acknowledged that the discussion on the functions in settings like this is driven more anecdotally, in our actual experience. Like the fact that our “J/P” difference affects the Thinking and iNtuition itself; so that you depend on statistical “fact” to determine “truth”, and I distrust that in favor of ideas fitting together. The point of type theory altogether is that this is what causes conflicts and misunderstanding, as we can plainly see here, but one is not “right” and the other “wrong” (so that you can tell the other person “think like me”; “go by the external data only, like I do”).
Gavin suggests your point is that this is fine, as long as I keep it separate from Jung and Myers. So I can talk about my Ti and Ne preference, but I can't at the same time say it has anything to do with being “INTP”, even though you have the letters T and N, and the introverted one being dominant indicates I according to the theory, and the iNtuition is a perception function that is “extraverted”, which was Myers' definition of “P".

Now, I even noticed on PerC that Turin was wearing “INFP”. Not sure if he still identifies as that. But he argues just like you, regarding the “fact” data. So that all of this time I thought I was arguing with another INTJ like yourself. (And so ironic that we had gone off on that trail about some other INFP I had referenced, when I could have just used him to make the point).
Gavin, on the other hand, seems to see things more your way, but still argues more like me, where things are all “open”, and he's always adressing and weighing the points of both sides, rather than taking a hard one is right and the other is wrong position. You may argue that's just the J/P difference, but then Turi is a “P” just like us. He is a bit more “open” than you are, but when i comes down to the logical aspect of the theories, he's just like you. (Of course, this point is moot if he no longer identifies as an FP type).

But no one is taking all of this stuff down, and entering it as “data pools”, because it's “barely been studied", because it's not taken seriously, because its barely been studied, because it's not taken seriously, because it's barely been studied, because it's not taken seriously... ad nauseam. So this experience just doesn't exist. It's all “unicorns and munchkins”, and not REAL people, then. Only formal “data pools” mean anything. (Meanwhile, after all that, the same is said about MBTI, despite all the work Myers did. They still liken it to the zodiac as well. This, again, is one reason why I don't rely on statistical data. Who to even believe!)

 

[reckful]

[MENTION=18736]reckful[/MENTION] You reposted two comments; one that had not been deleted

I reposted three posts, and I've gone back through the thread, and as far as I can see, they'd all been deleted.

Which post are you talking about?

 

[reckful]

So I acknowledged that the discussion on the functions in settings like this is driven more anecdotally, in our actual experience. Like the fact that our "J/P" difference affects the Thinking and iNtuition itself; so that you depend on statistical "fact" to determine "truth", and I distrust that in favor of ideas fitting together. The point of type theory altogether is that this is what causes conflicts and misunderstanding, as we can plainly see here[I/], but one is not "right" and the other "wrong" (so that you can tell the other person "think like me"; "go by the external data only, like I do").

People have been making anecdotal observations that purport to support zodiac-based personality typings for centuries, Eric. But whenever anybody tries to correlate zodiac signs with any aspect of personality in a study that involves a suitably large sample, it turns out there are no statistically significant correlations at all.

And that's why I'm inclined to insist on the bogosity of the zodiac if I encounter someone offering anecdotal observations about, e.g., what aspects of personality Capricorns tend to have in common.

But assuming you're dealing with a typology whose groupings have established some respectable level of validity by way of correlational studies, do I object to forum discussions that involve anecdotal observations of what people in those various categories tend to be like? Not at all.

And if you're interested, you can find a longer discussion of that issue in this post.

For your convenience, here's some of it:

Imagine that there are seven people you know pretty well who consider themselves NFs and seven people you know pretty well who consider themselves STs, and it seems to you that those preferences are reasonably strong/clear in those people. And suppose you're sitting there thinking about that anecdotal sample of NFs and STs and thinking about ways they seem to be opposites of each other, and pondering whether they seem to suggest one or more aspects of NF type and/or ST type that go beyond what you can remember having read about. And then suppose you go on an MBTI forum and throw out those anecdotal observations for discussion.

Do I have any objection to any of that? Not at all.

If it turns out there have been large-sample studies that bear on those same correlations, then I'd encourage you to have the perspective that all other things being equal, large-sample studies are more likely to indicate type correlations that are real and/or typical than anecdotal observations. But lots of type descriptions in sources I consider worthy (e.g., Myers and Keirsey) are partly based on the accumulated anecdotal experience that the authors have had in dealing with the various types.

But now suppose you're sitting there thinking about seven people you know pretty well who are Capricorns and seven people you know who are Libras, and you're thinking about ways the Capricorns seem to be similar (and different from the Libras) and ways the Libras seem to be similar (and different from the Capricorns).

If that's what you're doing, and you're a friend of mine, I have no qualms about confessing that I'd be strongly inclined to do my best to convince you that your time would be better spent thinking about personality-type categories with a respectable claim to validity. And at the least, I'd want to try to convince you that — as an objective (really!) matter — you should at least recognize that there's a significant difference (from a scientific respectability perspective) between the kinds of categories you're focusing on and categories that can make a respectable claim to psychometric validity.

You see the distinction? Nobody should claim — and I certainly don't — that any current personality typology is in anything like a final state, or that the studies that have already been done, or the books that have already been written, come anywhere close to figuring out and capturing everything that can be said about the types. That's a very open-ended task, and at the end of the day, essentially an infinite task.

But very much by contrast, establishing whether a set of proposed typological categories has some basic level of validity — setting aside what the full and rich nature of those categories might consist of — is a much more finite task, and something that psychologists are capable of doing with a far-from-ginormous body of studies.

And countless MBTI studies, over 50 years, have established the validity of the four MBTI dichotomies, and have also demonstrated countless correlations with dichotomy combinations in the manner reflected by what I call the Real MBTI Model.

And very much by contrast, and as further detailed in my earlier posts, the correlational patterns that would correspond to the Harold Grant stack have failed to show up — which puts the "tertiary Si" of an INFP in the Capricorn category.

And anybody's free to ponder the effect that "tertiary Si" is having on their INFP friends, just like they're free to ponder what stuff their Capricorn friends have in common. But my hope would be that, if they're going to do that kind of pondering, they should at least understand that there's an important distinction to be made between the categories they're pondering and categories with a respectable claim to validity.

And as you know, the MBTI forums are full of posts by people who fail to understand that distinction, and who treat the respectable districts of the MBTI and the validity-free districts as if they're all the same kind of thing, and/or as if they're all equally "valid" perspectives.​

 

[GavinElster]

Gavin, on the other hand, seems to see things more your way

For what it's worth, I think the extent of my overlap is as follows:

(1) I generally think reckful's readings of Jung are strongly supported in the text -- the one point I like to add in addition/that I'm trying to get his thoughts on, though, is this business about only-one-conscious vs two-conscious -- that is, why did Jung say the former (not just that you can be conscious without absolute sovereignty, but why is it that in a suitable sense, you are conscious only if you have said sovereignty)? The latter seems to support reckful's 'general slant' more than the former. On the other hand, towards reckful's point, there's reason to think the latter is the less esoteric, more 'regular' interpretation.

(2) I really enjoy functions theory myself. I'm a junkie -- I cannot imagine reckful really is. I love comparing and contrasting socionics, Beebe, Grant, Jung, and so on just for the sake of it, and even lots of alternatives built by other Jungians. I also spend time reading about the data-driven sides like the Big 5, though, because I do acknowledge how speculative the functions theory is, and can feel the pang of regret from time to time. Also, some of the insights of Big 5/dichotomies-driven MBTI are pretty fascinating of their own right once you acknowledge it goes beyond the test.

With that side (2), there's at least some ambiguity what side I'm on!

 

[Eric B]

I reposted three posts, and I've gone back through the thread, and as far as I can see, they'd all been deleted.

Which post are you talking about?

I was talking about the first, but maybe that was deleted too. I thought I had seen it when I looked through what was left.

People have been making anecdotal observations that purport to support zodiac-based personality typings for centuries, Eric. But whenever anybody tries to correlate zodiac signs with any aspect of personality in a study that involves a suitably large sample, it turns out there are no statistically significant correlations at all.

And that's why I'm inclined to insist on the bogosity of the zodiac if I encounter someone offering anecdotal observations about, e.g., what aspects of personality Capricorns tend to have in common.

But assuming you're dealing with a typology whose groupings have established some respectable level of validity by way of correlational studies, do I object to forum discussions that involve anecdotal observations of what people in those various categories tend to be like? Not at all.

And if you're interested, you can find a longer discussion of that issue in this post.

For your convenience, here's some of it:

Imagine that there are seven people you know pretty well who consider themselves NFs and seven people you know pretty well who consider themselves STs, and it seems to you that those preferences are reasonably strong/clear in those people. And suppose you're sitting there thinking about that anecdotal sample of NFs and STs and thinking about ways they seem to be opposites of each other, and pondering whether they seem to suggest one or more aspects of NF type and/or ST type that go beyond what you can remember having read about. And then suppose you go on an MBTI forum and throw out those anecdotal observations for discussion.

Do I have any objection to any of that? Not at all.

If it turns out there have been large-sample studies that bear on those same correlations, then I'd encourage you to have the perspective that all other things being equal, large-sample studies are more likely to indicate type correlations that are real and/or typical than anecdotal observations. But lots of type descriptions in sources I consider worthy (e.g., Myers and Keirsey) are partly based on the accumulated anecdotal experience that the authors have had in dealing with the various types.

But now suppose you're sitting there thinking about seven people you know pretty well who are Capricorns and seven people you know who are Libras, and you're thinking about ways the Capricorns seem to be similar (and different from the Libras) and ways the Libras seem to be similar (and different from the Capricorns).

If that's what you're doing, and you're a friend of mine, I have no qualms about confessing that I'd be strongly inclined to do my best to convince you that your time would be better spent thinking about personality-type categories with a respectable claim to validity. And at the least, I'd want to try to convince you that — as an objective (really!) matter — you should at least recognize that there's a significant difference (from a scientific respectability perspective) between the kinds of categories you're focusing on and categories that can make a respectable claim to psychometric validity.

You see the distinction? Nobody should claim — and I certainly don't — that any current personality typology is in anything like a final state, or that the studies that have already been done, or the books that have already been written, come anywhere close to figuring out and capturing everything that can be said about the types. That's a very open-ended task, and at the end of the day, essentially an infinite task.

But very much by contrast, establishing whether a set of proposed typological categories has some basic level of validity — setting aside what the full and rich nature of those categories might consist of — is a much more finite task, and something that psychologists are capable of doing with a far-from-ginormous body of studies.

And countless MBTI studies, over 50 years, have established the validity of the four MBTI dichotomies, and have also demonstrated countless correlations with dichotomy combinations in the manner reflected by what I call the Real MBTI Model.

And very much by contrast, and as further detailed in my earlier posts, the correlational patterns that would correspond to the Harold Grant stack have failed to show up — which puts the "tertiary Si" of an INFP in the Capricorn category.

And anybody's free to ponder the effect that "tertiary Si" is having on their INFP friends, just like they're free to ponder what stuff their Capricorn friends have in common. But my hope would be that, if they're going to do that kind of pondering, they should at least understand that there's an important distinction to be made between the categories they're pondering and categories with a respectable claim to validity.

And as you know, the MBTI forums are full of posts by people who fail to understand that distinction, and who treat the respectable districts of the MBTI and the validity-free districts as if they're all the same kind of thing, and/or as if they're all equally "valid" perspectives.​

To start, I've looked over Reynierse's claims about these "eight studies" in the MBTI Manual that he's all discounted for one reason or another. Here's the whole quote you took that from:

There are four additional points to be made here. First, six studies were cited that did not demonstrate expected type dynamics predictions. Whether or not the studies cited in the MBTI Manual provide a good test of type dynamics and are in fact weak tests of type dynamics as argued there misses the point. Regardless, they still failed to support type dynamics.

Second, Thorne and Gough's (1991) observer ratings and the reanalysis of that data for the dominant and auxiliary forms of the N, T and F functions does not, as contended, support type dynamics. The MBTI Manual identified the overlap in the 10 most and 10 least adjective descriptors for the dominant and auxiliary forms of N, T, and F for both males and females and then stated, “These percentages range from 0.0 to 13.8, suggesting that independent observers, who did not know the types of people they were dmibing, clearly did not see much similarity between types having the dominant versus auxiliary forms of Thinking, Feeling, or Intuition”
(p. 204). The implication is that there are striking differences between the dominant and auxiliary as predicted by type dynamics. There is a fundamental baseline problem for these comparisons, however, as Thorne and Goughs observers did not find much similarity anywhere, even within the same types—a result that might be expected, as observers made ratings using a rich and diverse pool of 300 adjectives.

Third, the original research based on national sample data, although presented in a cursory fashion and for a very limited set of dependent variables, provided some, albeit limited, support for type dynamics. Dominant extraverted thinking (DET) was greater than auxiliary extraverted thinking (AET) for both health and friendships dependent variables and dominant extraverted feeling (DEF) was greater than auxiliary extraverted feeling (AEF) for a social dependent
variable (MBTI Manual Table 9.21, p. 203). At the same time, there were also significant reversals that are incompatible with a type dynamics interpretation and contradict it. Auxiliary introverted sensing (AIS) was greater than dominant introverted sensing (DIS) for an accomplishment-dependent variable and auxiliary introverted intuition (AIN) was greater than dominant introverted intuition (DIN) for a home-and-family-dependent variable (MBTI Manual Table 9.22. p. 204). Support then was about as frequent as disconfirmation and not particularly compelling.

Fourth, the discussion of type dynamics introduced very restrictive conditions for evaluating the efflcacy of type dynamics. e.g., requiring first a significant effect for the E—1 x J—P interaction term, an effect that occurred rarely for the national sample data and in other investigations (Reynierse St Harker. 2001). Such restrictive methodological requirements do not correspond with the generality and ubiquity of type dynamics anclications—applications in which type dynamics interpretations are unrestricted. In my judgment, type theory is better served by embracing both theory and method that are inclusive and where the application applies to all—without restriction—dependent variables.

And that is the full extent of direct support for type dynamics as reported in the MBTI Manual (1998)—six studies that failed, one with a questionable interpretation, and one where contradictory evidence was offered as support.

"Six that failed":
For the first three; from the Manual itself: "However, in all three studies only half or fewer of the people had higher scores for the dominant function than the auxiliary function"

The next three simply found "no significant association" or "any support for making a distinction between dominant and auxiliary functions". I don't know what exactly he means by "questionable interpretation" and "contradictory evidence" for the remaining two, but his fourth point is just his own "judgment" of these "conditions" being too "restrictive". Like I said, this ultimately boils down to mostly just one man's interpretation of the data.

And I notice all of these studies are about the differences between a given function as dominant vs auxiliary. The Manual itself (p.204) addresses this and the problems with the results of those studies:

Although these findings appear to be contrary to the predictions of type theory, it is important to examine these hypotheses tested in these studies and the assumptions that underlie the approaches taken by these authors to testing their hypothesis.

First, all of the analyses described above either tacitly or explicitly assign unintended meaning to high or low preference scores. Even the original hypothesis that drives the analyses—that the person's score on the dominant function should be higher than the score on the auxiliary function—is not consistent with curent intepretations of the theory (Myers & Kirby, 1994) and is therefore not a good test of type theory. The magnitude of the preference scores used in these studies does not indicate development, skill, aptitude, maturity or excellence in the use of a function. (The same is true of the preference clarity indexes used in form M [i.e. the % "scores" you get for each preference in a respondent's results]).
Yet the meaning ascribed to these scores by the hypothesis and the analyses that derive from it ignores the categorical nature of the preference scales and assumes a quantitative linkage between the properties measured by MBTI and the scores used to identify type preferences.

Second, the item responses that form the basis for classifying people into different preferences are designed to appeal to people of one prefernce or the other on a given scale. For example, the "S" response to an S_N item was written to appeal to all Sensing types. Measurement at this gross level of the overall preferences does not permit direct inferences about the dominant or auxiliary status of the functions based solely on preference scores.

Third, by its very nature the dominant form of a function is presumed to be different from its auxiliary form. Myers' method of identifying dominant versus auxiliary functions assumed an interaction between E-I and J-P dichotomies The impact of this interaction shows up in its effect on the forms and attitudes of the Judging and Perceiving functions.

The characteristics of dominant introverted Feeling, for example, are different and separate from those facets of Feeling that are shared among all Feeling types. Few authors have spelled out such differences explicitly (an exception is Myers & Kirby, 1994). This is one area of type theory that is open for future development. Nevertheless, at present the theory presumes that such differences are real and can be observed. Studies that simply compare scores of dominant and auxiliary functions ignore these differences.

So I would also say that the differences between the dominant and auxiliary won't be as great as between the dominant and tertiary or inferior, which is the issue you have raised with me regarding "tandems", and "INFP's and ESTJ's having something in common". It's easy to confuse the dominant and auxiliary, and this will result in I/E uncertainty, which a lot of people have. (Keirsey even said that as a standalone dichotomy, it's the least important). Sometimes, the dominant is so "second nature", it actually becomes "unconscious" in a way. (This is something I had forgotten to mention in the discussion with Turi). These tests they're using aren't going to pick up all of that.

Reynierse just dismisses this, because it "still failed to support type dynamics", but it touches upon what I meant to add; that perhaps the "evidence" you and Reynierse are demanding (in the "over 50 years of MBTI data pools") isn't even being looked for in whatever studies are done. They don't ask how a Sensing type uses iNtuition, how an iNtuition type uses Sensing, how a Thinking type uses Feeling, and how a Feeling type uses Thinking; and all according to the different ways to "use" the functions (i.e. internally or externally), such as what I've illustrated here. They just use dichotomy-based scores showing THAT S, N, T or F are preferred over their opposites; not what exactly happens to what's unpreferred. So of course they're not going to pick up any similarities between opposites like ESTJ and INFP. They're not even looking in the right place! If they're only looking for "whatever you're correlating with MBTI type is something where the INFPs are notably out toward one end of the correlational spectrum...[and]...the ESTJs out toward the other end." So then that's likely all they're going to find.

(I should also address "Maybe someday...you'll stop pretending that INFPs and ESTJs have any MBTI-related aspects of personality in common." But what exactly do you even mean by this? We all discuss functions as "TYPE-related", and the versions of "type" we discuss is the 16 types of "MBTI", so we may in that way associates the functions with "MBTI", (and also call them "JCF"), but who here has ever really "associated" them with the specific "MBTI", to the extent you're criticizing? I know I certainly haven't. (At least not involving "tandems" or the tertiary or other unpreferred stack positions). This is how the discussion always became about how well functions measure up to Myers or Jung, which you then said wasn't your point and I was misreading you!)

The only thing functions have in common with the zodiac in my view is the "anecdotal" part. It assumes people's behaviors are shaped by the time of year they were born in based on the stars, but functions are about how we divide reality. That sounds a bit more practical and ultimately concrete, to me.
So they need to come up with a test to cover the differences I point out here; like which types depend on external "fact" data to determine truth, or determine truth from internal analysis.
Why it hasn't been studied like that yet, I don't know (the manual continues with ways it can be studied, including based on observation), but if you say it's because they're not taken seriously, or because they're "like Capricorn", then we get back to the tautology, where they're not taken seriously because they're like zodiac, because they haven't been studied, because they're not taken seriously, because they're zodiac...

The ultimate thing is, is that this is not an empirical data lab; it's a hobbyist forum where people discuss how type fits in their experience, and to many, the functions do make sense and explain things. Why you're constantly trying to bring it up to some sort of "scientific" standard by so zealously aiming to convince everyone that functions are like the zodiac, and they shouldn't associate them in any way with "MBTI" type or Jung, is where our misunderstanding lies.

 

[Jaguar]

.

"Maybe someday...you'll stop pretending that INFPs and ESTJs have any MBTI-related aspects of personality in common."

Jung just shit his coffin. Some people just don't get it.

 

[reckful]

Reynierse just dismisses this, because it "still failed to support type dynamics", but it touches upon what I meant to add; that perhaps the "evidence" you and Reynierse are demanding (in the "over 50 years of MBTI data pools") isn't even being looked for in whatever studies are done.

Please.

When a personality psychologist theorizes that a typological grouping has validity (i.e., corresponds to something real about the people grouped together), the burden is on that typologist to prove it by putting a questionnaire together or performing some other kind of studies that demonstrate that, yes indeed, those "Fi/Te types" (for example) really do have some aspect(s) of personality in common that tends to distinguish them (on average) from the "Fe/Ti types."

The burden isn't on other people to somehow disprove their proposed grouping.

You say, "perhaps the 'evidence' you and Reynierse are demanding ... isn't even being looked for in whatever studies are done."

And there are two reasons this "response" of yours fails miserably.

And the first is the point I already made. Berens and Nardi (among others) have been peddling the Grant stack for many years now, and peddling it without mentioning (in their books) that, unlike the aspects of the MBTI with respectable psychometric support, the supposed tertiary Si of an INFP has the same degree of established validity as the zodiac.

Allow me to note that a personality psychologist with what passes for intellectual integrity here at Casa Reckful would perform enough studies to establish some respectable level of validity for their model before they began selling books that talked about it as if it was in the same category as the (real) MBTI, instead of being honest about the fact that it was in the zodiac category.

If the "evidence I and Reynierse are demanding ... isn't even being looked for" (as you suggested), why not? That's how personality psychology works.

But wait! The psychometric status of the Grant stack is actually much worse than simply not proven but, uh, nobody's really tried.

We now have — as I've said umpteenjillion times — over 50 years of MBTI data pools. And they involve correlating the MBTI types with everything under the sun, including countless aspects of personality as separately measured by lots of other established personality instruments.

And the thing is... when anything gets correlated with the MBTI types, the correlational patterns that result are what they are. They don't depend on what whoever gathered the data might have been expecting, or thought they were testing for.

Assuming that Ne, Ni, Se, Si, Te, Ti, Fe and Fi correspond to significant aspects of personality — and if they're used to refer to stuff that NPs, NJs, SPs, SJs, TJs, TPs, FJs and FPs, respectively, tend to have in common, they certainly do — and given that we now have thousands of data pools correlating the MBTI types with a huge variety of things, if it was true that NJs and SPs are both "Ni/Se types," and that NPs and SJs are both "Ne/Si types" (for example), then there should be some significant body of data pools where Ne, Ni, Se and/or Si were the most significant MBTI-related influences on whatever the study was looking at — and where, accordingly, the NJs and SPs showed up on one side of the correlational spectrum and the NPs and SJs showed up on the other.

But that correlational pattern — like all patterns that are inconsistent with the Real MBTI Model — virtually never shows up. Instead, regardless of what aspect of personality it is that somebody's study may be focusing on, if the SJs show up at one end of the spectrum, look for the NPs to show up at the other end — just as the Real MBTI Model would lead you to expect.

Reynierse's articles caused quite a stir in the MBTI community, as I understand it. And all Berens or Nardi or any other proud HaroldGrantian needed to do to refute his assertion that the functions are just a "category mistake" — not to mention provide, at long last, some respectable support for the Grant stack — was to go through the vast stores of existing MBTI data and find a respectable body of results reflecting one of those HaroldGrantian patterns (TJs/FPs on one side and TPs/FJs on the other, or SJs/NPs on one side and SPs/NJs on the other). Because if either of those patterns — which are decidedly inconsistent with what Reynierse calls "preference multidimensionality" (i.e., the simple additive effects of the four preferences) — ever turned up in a respectable body of MBTI data, well, that's what validity is all about.

And instead, as I understand it, the response to Reynierse (as far as the validity issue goes) has been... *crickets*.

And the reason the response has been *crickets* is because 50 years of MBTI data pools are full of evidence in support of the correlations associated with the Real MBTI Model, and spectacularly lacking in evidence in support of the HaroldGrantian "tandems" — or any other aspect of "type dynamics" that goes beyond (or is inconsistent with) the Real MBTI Model.

 

[reckful]

(I should also address "Maybe someday...you'll stop pretending that INFPs and ESTJs have any MBTI-related aspects of personality in common." But what exactly do you even mean by this? We all discuss functions as "TYPE-related", and the versions of "type" we discuss is the 16 types of "MBTI", so we may in that way associates the functions with "MBTI", (and also call them "JCF"), but who here has ever really "associated" them with the specific "MBTI", to the extent you're criticizing? I know I certainly haven't. (At least not involving "tandems" or the tertiary or other unpreferred stack positions). This is how the discussion always became about how well functions measure up to Myers or Jung, which you then said wasn't your point and I was misreading you!)

It's déjà vu all over again!

A long time Not that long ago, at a typology forum not that far away, you aimed this "MBTI-related" objection at me:

THAT's how an INFP and ESTJ can be opposite in two dimensions, and yet have something in common. ... (And you slip in the qualifier "MBTI-related aspects", but who really said "MBTI-related"? The commonality lies in the functions, which the MBTI is not measuring, so this is a red-herring.​

And I replied thusly:

My "MBTI-related" qualifier was emphatically not meant to distinguish between dichotomies and functions.

When I note that the Real MBTI Model says that INFPs and ESTJs have "no MBTI-related aspects of personality in common," while the HaroldGrantians say that INFPs and ESTJs have "quite a lot of MBTI-related aspects of personality in common," I'm referring to any aspects of personality that can rightly (in terms of consistency with reality) be associated with people of the applicable MBTI types, whether they're purportedly attributed to dichotomy-based categories or function-based categories.​

Thanks for listening, as always, Eric, and I look forward to you "misunderstanding" me again on this issue in another few months.