I remember being surprised to read a post of yours, a while back, where you indicated you didn't actually have a copy of
Psychological Types. Is that still true? Your latest posts in this thread certainly make it sound that way.
I don't understand how somebody could do as much writing as you have about Jung's type-related views (on internet forums and elsewhere) without having read
Psychological Types — not to mention owning a copy to refer to.
In any case, FYI,
Psychological Types was published in its entirety (Chapters 1 through 11) in 1921. When the
Collected Works edition was published in 1960 (with Jung's input), four short articles (from 1913, 1925, 1928 and 1936) were added as an Appendix at the end.
So your assertion that "Psychological Types is a
collection of Jung's writing spanning a length of time. So he may have
changed his view on some things between the different chapters" is a major-league mischaracterization.
And more significantly, your suggestion that Grant and Beebe's writings are appropriately characterized as "filling in the loose ends of Jung's theory" is a
grotesque mischaracterization. The Harold Grant function stack — especially as carried forward with the "tandems" focus beloved by so many bamboozled MBTI forumites — is unquestionably
inconsistent with Jung's conceptions of the types. And Beebe's fifth through eighth functions have no significant basis in Jung's model.
But most importantly, on the main issue you've been discussing with GavinElster — the consciousness and attitude of the auxiliary — there really isn't any respectable argument to be made that Jung didn't believe that, in the
typical case (and he thought it was very much the typical case for one of his types to have an auxiliary function), the auxiliary function was both
predominantly conscious, and had the
same attitude as the dominant function.
And you can read a long explanation of that (with multiple Jung quotes) in
this two-part post.
Not only did Jung refer to the dom and aux as the "conscious functions" (and the tert and inf as the "unconscious ones") in
Psychological Types, but 30 years later, in
Individual Dream Symbolism in Relation to Alchemy, Jung's model hadn't changed. As he explained:
If we think of the psychological function [sic] as arranged in a circle, then the most differentiated function is usually the carrier of the ego and, equally regularly, has an auxiliary function attached to it. The "inferior" function, on the other hand, is unconscious and for that reason is projected into a non-ego. It too has an auxiliary function. ...
In the psychology of the functions there are two conscious and therefore masculine functions, the differentiated function and its auxiliary, which are represented in dreams by, say, father and son, whereas the unconscious functions appear as mother and daughter. Since the conflict between the two auxiliary functions is not nearly as great as that between the differentiated and the inferior function, it is possible for the third function — that is, the unconscious auxiliary one — to be raised to consciousness and thus made masculine. It will, however, bring with it traces of its contamination with the inferior function, thus acting as a kind of link with the darkness of the unconscious.
So... by 1952 (if not sooner), he'd decided that it was
possible (albeit not the usual case) for the
tertiary function to be "raised to consciousness and thus made masculine" — although
in contrast to the auxiliary, it would retain significant "traces" that would cause it to "act as a kind of link with ... the unconscious."
But in both 1921 and 1952, he took the view that it was the
typical case for the auxiliary to be a
predominantly conscious function.
And speaking of follow-up writings, and moving now to the
attitude issue...
In 1923 (two years after
Psychological Types was published), as also noted in that two-part linked post, Jung gave a lecture (separately published in 1925) that's included in that
Collected Works appendix I mentioned. After some opening remarks on the shortcomings of past approaches to typology, here's how he began his discussion of extraverts and introverts:
f we wish to define the psychological peculiarity of a man in terms that will satisfy not only our own subjective judgment but also the object judged, we must take as our criterion that state or attitude which is felt by the object to be the conscious, normal condition. Accordingly, we shall make his conscious motives our first concern, while eliminating as far as possible our own arbitrary interpretations.
Proceeding thus we shall discover, after a time, that in spite of the great variety of conscious motives and tendencies, certain groups of individuals can be distinguished who are characterized by a striking conformity of motivation. For example, we shall come upon individuals who in all their judgments, perceptions, feelings, affects, and actions feel external factors to be the predominant motivating force, or who at least give weight to them no matter whether causal or final motives are in question. I will give some examples of what I mean. St. Augustine: "I would not believe the Gospel if the authority of the Catholic Church did not compel it." ... One man finds a piece of modern music beautiful because everybody else pretends it is beautiful. Another marries in order to please his parents but very much against his own interests. ... There are not a few who in everything they do or don't do have but one motive in mind: what will others think of them? "One need not be ashamed of a thing if nobody knows about it."
He characterizes extraverts as people "who in all their judgments, perceptions, feelings, affects, and actions feel external factors to be the predominant motivating force." Judgments and perceptions both.
How can you possibly reconcile that with the notion that Jung's model called for an extravert to either be extraverted in their judgments and introverted in their perceptions or vice versa?
And again, that two-part linked post has a lot more reasons why the notion that Jung viewed the auxiliary as having the opposite attitude to the dominant is essentially unsupportable.
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And moving to Nietzsche specifically...
Here again (this time in the Hull translation) is the paragraph that points to Nietzsche from Chapter 10 of Psychological Types. It's the opening paragraph of Jung's section on The Introverted Thinking Type.
Just as we might take Darwin as an example of the normal extraverted thinking type, the normal introverted thinking type could be represented by Kant. The one speaks with facts, the other relies on the subjective factor. Darwin ranges over the wide field of objective reality. Kant restricts himself to a critique of knowledge. Cuvier and Nietzsche would form an even sharper contrast.
So no, Eric, there's really no "ambiguity" there. And not only is Jung pointing to Nietzsche as an introverted thinking type — he's pointing to him as a particularly "sharp" example, in terms of exemplifying the differences between Te and Ti.
And no, there's really no chance that Jung was reversing the Te/Ti order for Nietzsche and Cuvier. As Wikipedia notes, Cuvier was "a French naturalist and zoologist" who is "sometimes referred to as the 'father of paleontology.'" He was "instrumental in establishing the fields of comparative anatomy and paleontology through his work in comparing living animals with fossils," and was clearly the Darwinian empiricist in the Cuvier/Nietzsche pairing.
But meanwhile, back in Chapter 3, Jung uses Nietzsche as his poster boy for P-doms (and Ni-doms in particular). So when Jung points to Nietzsche as a noteworthy Ti type in Chapter 10, he can't be saying Nietzsche was a Ti-dom. He's saying Nietzsche was a Ti-aux.
And again, Jung's function stack for a typical Ni-dom with a T-aux was Ni-Ti-Fe-Se, so that all adds up.
And GavinElster is also correct on the "intellect" issue. Jung uses the terms "intellect" and "intellectual" repeatedly, throughout Psychological Types, to refer to the thinking function and thinking types.