" 'Sympathy' and 'empathy' refer to two distinct and complex psychological capacities that have quite distinct meanings. Nevertheless, philosophers and psychologists have had tremendous difficulty keeping the two concepts distinct. Since the classic works by Max Scheler on sympathy and by Edith Stein on empathy, theorists have been trying to define the terms by supposing empathy is merely a type of sympathy... In empathy, the self is the vehicle for understanding, and it never loses its identity. Sympathy, on the other hand, is concerned with communion rather than accuracy, and self-awareness is reduced rather than enhanced. In empathy, one person reaches out for the other person, whereas in sympathy the sympathizer is moved by the other person... To know what something would be like for the other person is empathy. To know what it would be like to be that person is sympathy. In empathy one acts "as if" one were the other person. (Rogers, 1957, p. 3) In sympathy one is the other person. (Macfie, 1959, p. 213). The object of empathy is understanding. The object of sympathy is the other person's well-being. In sum, sympathy is a way of relating."
Sympathy and empathy
Irene Switankowsky. Philosophy Today. Celina: Spring 2000. Vol. 44, Iss. 1; pg. 86, 7 pgs