Atheists Who Claim There is a God

[tinker683]

No, it's not like that. I am not really arguing that God exists. I am arguing that atheists should, by their own standards (normally those of empiricism/Bayesianism), consider the existence of God as more supported by the evidence every time they observe something new that is not God. It's really an argument about epistemology.

1) This statement only has meaning if there is a generally accepted, coherent definition of the word "God" and if all atheists were atheists were because of empiricism/Bayesianism
2) Why would I have to conclude that there is a god if I observe something new as opposed to...say....any other number of possibilities?

 

[A window to the soul]

Whatever you want: it hardly matters because the argument is mostly formal. That's why I used meaningless symbols to begin with. The argument can then have general application regardless of what "qualifies as evidence."

No need to be so concrete. What are you, an SJ?

It does matter to me. Regardless of where you're going with this discussion, my mind is somewhere else trying apply your formulas according to Atheist standards to see what I get. Which is my first step to a total redesign and possible takeover of the Atheist organization. :x

 

[reason]

1) This statement only has meaning if there is a generally accepted, coherent definition of the word "God" and if all atheists were atheists were because of empiricism/Bayesianism

The statement has meaning because it says something in the English language and other English speakers, like you, understand it well-enough to critique. A statement is not meaningless just because it could have been expressed more precisely. In fact, it hardly matters how "God" is defined in the context of this argument, so long as the concept of God is not incoherent and God can manifest in an some observable form. Technically, "God" could be defined as a talking hamster and the argument would still be valid, though I had in mind something more traditional.

Most atheists, I think, are, at least, closet empiricists and would be Bayesianists too if they pursued matters further.

2) Why would I have to conclude that there is a god if I observe something new as opposed to...say....any other number of possibilities?

You wound't have to do anything. The point is that every observation of something that is not God increases the evidential support for the proposition that God exists (even though the probability falls as expected). That doesn't mean, necessarily, that God's existence is more probable than His non-existence, but merely that one probability has increased relative to the other.

More to the point, this argument works for pretty much anything. God is just an amusing example.

 

[reason]

If the number of things in existence is infinite, isn't that moot?

Not with a subjective interpretation of probability.

 

[Red Herring]

Positive and negative atheists, agnostics with atheist leaning, skeptics, etc. I've got a message for the whole lot of ya:

 

[Xyk]

By the same logic, we can also conclude that every single fictional thing is probably true. See Russell's Teapot.

 

[Fluffywolf]

Positive and negative atheists, agnostics with atheist leaning, skeptics, etc. I've got a message for the whole lot of ya:

No thanks.

 

[Red Herring]

No thanks.

Goed dat je niet in Amerika woont!

 

[Fluffywolf]

Goed dat je niet in Amerika woont!

AAAH! Don't scare me like that. When did you turn dutch anyway.

 

[Red Herring]

Ha ha ha. Nej, ik ben Duits.

But I thought I'd make a little extra effort for you. I do think the sociocultural context in the US is different to ours over here, that's all.

 

[Fluffywolf]

Ach so, Ich danke Ihnen vielmals für Ihre Bemühung.

 

[reason]

By the same logic, we can also conclude that every single fictional thing is probably true. See Russell's Teapot.

Not quite. By the same logic, we can also conclude that the existence of Russell's teapot is less probable but more supported by the evidence.

 

[Xyk]

Not quite. By the same logic, we can also conclude that the existence of Russell's teapot is less probable but more supported by the evidence.

I only skimmed the OP. It was long and had a lot of math words.

 

[NegativeZero]

So OP, what you're saying is that you're a sophist?

 

[Lateralus]

I guess not.

A (subjective) Bayesianist would say the only place a probability could be is in your mind. Then it would only depend on whether we decide to include 0 and 1 as probabilities.

Anyway, it is customary among such philosophies to only assign the probability of 1 or 0 in the cases of, respectively, tautologies and contradictions. Anything else is something like (notwithstanding Quine) a synthetic proposition (i.e. a proposition that cannot be proved true or false by purely logical reasoning) and should only be assigned a probability between 0 and 1. Perhaps some theories of God are contradictory, but I don't think all have to be.

Of course, these kind of philosophies often have difficulties with synthetic propositions that do not predict anything in particular about what can be observed, i.e. metaphysics. Normally these philosophies just refuse to deal with such statements, branding them "meaningless" or "irrelevant." They normally get themselves into a host of logical quandaries for that reason.

Probabilities are only useful in describing future potential events. Past events either happened or they didn't happen. Assigning a probability to the existence of any sort of god, who must exist in the past and present, is ridiculous. I get really annoyed when atheists do it.

 

[erm]

Probabilities are only useful in describing future potential events. Past events either happened or they didn't happen. Assigning a probability to the existence of any sort of god, who must exist in the past and present, is ridiculous. I get really annoyed when atheists do it.

Probability is useful for describing unknown things. The future is more unknown than the present and past, generally, but probabilities can be used with all of them.

 

[Lateralus]

Probability is useful for describing unknown things. The future is more unknown than the present and past, generally, but probabilities can be used with all of them.

No, it's not. Any probability we assign to something that is unknown (such as the existence of God or the existence of extra-terrestrial life) cannot possibly be correct because we do not have enough information. If we had enough information, we wouldn't need a probability.

 

[erm]

No, it's not. Any probability we assign to something that is unknown cannot possibly be correct because we do not have enough information.

Name one thing that we assign probability to, which we already know.

If you knew all the significant variables surrounding a coin flip, there is no probability for you. You simply know whether it will land heads or tails before it happens.

Probability changes as knowledge does. Think Monty Hall scenario (the contestant has the probability change with new knowledge, the host has no probability in the first place because he knows what's behind each door). It exists to fill in the gaps where knowledge hasn't provided certainty.

 

[Lateralus]

Name one thing that we assign probability to, which we already know.

If you knew all the significant variables surrounding a coin flip, there is no probability for you. You simply know whether it will land heads or tails before it happens.

Probability changes as knowledge does. Think Monty Hall scenario.

Poker hands because we know the rules of the game. Do we know all of the rules of the universe? No.

 

[erm]

Poker hands because we know the rules of the game. Do we know all of the rules of the universe? No.

You don't know what's in each other's hands, hence probabilities. You do know what's in your own hand, hence no probability.