It's been a very useful framework for me.
But fyi, I came upon the idea via Eric B and uumlau, so they deserve most of the credit.
I would say it still is an issue, but I would add that if perception is not objective, then the judgments based off that perception definitely aren't.
Therefore, by labeling perceptive functions "objective" and judgment functions "subjective", we're not so much saying that perceptive functions see the thing as it is, but merely that, relative to making a judgment based on that perception, it is more objective, less subjective. It's simply a matter of: has a value judgment been made or not.
You might also have noticed that, among the perceptive functions, the arrangement of most objective to least objective goes: Se, Si, Ne, Ni.
You might also notice I'm an Ni-dom.
Now, just because I'm willing to label Se as most objective, doesn't mean that I don't think that Ni (or Ne, or Si) has insights into reality that Se might miss -- so there definitely seems to be a limit to the degree to which this framework can be used to determine objectivity and subjectivity.
Hence, why I think it's an interesting and useful framework to start a conversation about objectivity and subjectivity, but it's not meant to be the end-all, be-all determining model for that topic.
Not sure how I feel about this one...
The difference in the subjectivity/objectivity between Te (OSO) and Ti (SSO) in my construction signifies that Te is extraverted and thus focuses on, sources from, or puts emphasis on the external world, while Ti is introverted and thus focuses on, sources from, or puts emphasis on the internal world. Going by those criteria, the labeling is valid.
Now, as to whether the labeling is sound... well, that's a whole nother matter.
What it seems like you're pointing out is the fact that either Ti's introversion makes it more convergent, and thus more objective, or that the "T" aspect of of Ti (as opposed to the "F" aspect of F functions) is more "powerful" or "objective" than the T aspect of Te.
These two arguments would basically be bringing up reasonable questions as to how sound the above construction really is...
I think there's certainly something to be said about introverted functions robustness (I started a thread about the matter a few months ago), and, in that sense, I do agree that Ti tends to be more exacting and demanding than Te when it comes to say, accepting something as true: it tends to want everything completely spelled out -- for it to be shown that the conclusion(s) follow(s) clearly from the premises, and that the premises are all clearly enumerated. In this way, I can see how Ti could be called more objective.
I also see how Te could be called more objective though, too.
From what I can tell (and I've had a disagreement with a Ti-user about this, while other Ti-users, as well as many Te-users, have agreed), Te does seem to be less concerned with providing as robust a logical proof as does Ti, but, at the same time, I believe it moves its focus from this activity, which I would call checking for internal/logical consistency (i.e., validity, as determined by certain assumed premises), to checking for soundness of the premises. It's kinda like: Ti is rationalism, while Te is empiricism. Ti seems to be very good at starting with first principles and then making a whole bunch of deductions from there, while Te seems to be designed to test the accuracy of those first principles. Te seems to be focused on attaining hard evidence, via rigorous scientific testing.
It seems to me the Ti users tend to be concerned with their own internal model, that is based off certain assumptions and definitions.
Te users seem to be less concerned with some internal model based off certain assumptions and definitions, but more concerned with seeing what definitions actually are true.
(I can just feel the Ti backlash coming in the form of "Te doesn't care about what's true, it only cares about what works".)
But I think this construction is overused and overly simplistic, because it begs the question: what is the relationship between representational truth (what is true about the world) and pragmatic truth (what works).
I mean, if something doesn't work; then how can it be representationally true? If it does work, while it might not be perfectly representational of the real world, at least it works...
I don't think it's true to say that Te users only care about pragmatic truth. I just think that pragmatic truth is, for the most part, as good as it gets for human beings (along with internally consistent truth), because the principle of uncertainty always prevents us from being absolutely certain as to whether what we think we know is actually representationally true.
I dunno, those are my thoughts on the matter...
As I said before, the construction is not perfect: it is what it is.