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  1. #31
    Nips away your dignity Fluffywolf's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by spamtar View Post
    Ok, I will call you as my attorney to raise the lack of requisit intent/ diminished capacity defense at my forum banning trial.
    I'll make sure that all those who accuse you of trolling simply aren't intelligent enough to fully comprehend the extent of your introverted thinking, fully structured and arguemented with several pages of solid explanation per every single sentence you wrote.

    Always works for me.
    ~Self-depricating Megalomaniacal Superwolf

  2. #32
    Ghost Monkey Soul Vizconde's Avatar
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    Strategy: Know and Understand the Rules of Engagement

    Part of being a troll is avoiding on getting caught red handed. Most internet forums have located via some link forum rules of conduct. Most people never bother to read them. Most moderators are unfamiliar with them or otherwise apply them inconsistently. It is always prudent for the troll to familiarize themselves with both the rules as well as past precedents of questionable conduct that has squeezed under the wire. Defeat them in detail. Remember also the rules/precedents also can act as a sword as well as a shield.
    I redact everything I have written or will write on this forum prior to, subsequent with and or after the fact of its writing. For entertainment purposes only and not to be taken seriously nor literally.

    Quote Originally Posted by Edgar View Post
    Spamtar - a strange combination of boorish drunkeness and erudite discussions, or what I call "an Irish academic"

  3. #33
    Head Pigeon Mad Hatter's Avatar
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    I'm pissed off by this thread already. No real information at all (but looking at the people who have posted so far, I can't say I'm surprised).
    Seriously, what's the point? Real trolls wouldn't post in such a thread anyway.
    It's all such BS. Especially from ... ermm ... Fluffywolf!
    IN SERIO FATVITAS.

    -τὸ γὰρ γράμμα ἀποκτέννει, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ζῳοποιεῖ-

  4. #34
    Nips away your dignity Fluffywolf's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Avis View Post
    I'm pissed off by this thread already. No real information at all (but looking at the people who have posted so far, I can't say I'm surprised).
    Seriously, what's the point? Real trolls wouldn't post in such a thread anyway.
    It's all such BS. Especially from ... ermm ... Fluffywolf!
    Don't start too big. Try trolling an NF or someone first before you attempt to take on an NT. I really don't want to discourage you so soon.
    ~Self-depricating Megalomaniacal Superwolf

  5. #35
    @.~*virinaĉo*~.@ Totenkindly's Avatar
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    PART I: CONCERNING GOD.


    DEFINITIONS.

    I. By that which is 'self-caused' I mean that of which the
    essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only
    conceivable as existent.

    II. A thing is called 'finite after its kind' when it can be
    limited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a body
    is called finite because we always conceive another greater body.
    So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a body is
    not limited by thought, nor a thought by body.

    III. By 'substance' I mean that which is in itself, and is
    conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a
    conception can be formed independently of any other conception.

    IV. By 'attribute' I mean that which the intellect perceives as
    constituting the essence of substance.

    V. By 'mode' I mean the modifications ("affectiones") of
    substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through,
    something other than itself.

    VI. By 'God' I mean a being absolutely infinite--that is, a
    substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each
    expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.

    >>>>>Explanation--I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after
    its kind: for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite
    attributes may be denied; but that which is absolutely infinite,
    contains in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involves
    no negation.

    VII. That thing is called 'free,' which exists solely by the
    necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is
    determined by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing is
    necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by
    something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of
    existence or action.

    VIII. By 'eternity' I mean existence itself, in so far as it is
    conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of
    that which is eternal.

    >>>>>Explanation--Existence of this kind is conceived as an
    eternal truth, like the essence of a thing and, therefore,
    cannot be explained by means of continuance or time, though
    continuance may be conceived without a beginning or end.

    AXIOMS. I. Everything which exists, exists either in itself or
    in something else.

    II. That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be
    conceived through itself.

    III. From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows;
    and, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is
    impossible that an effect can follow.

    IV. The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the
    knowledge of a cause.

    V. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the
    one by means of the other; the conception of one does not involve
    the conception of the other.

    VI. A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object.

    VII. If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence
    does not involve existence.

    PROPOSITIONS. I. Substance is by nature prior to its
    modifications.

    >>>>>Proof--This is clear from Deff. iii. and v.

    II. Two substances, whose attributes are different, have
    nothing in common.

    >>>>>Proof--Also evident from Def. iii. For each must exist in
    itself, and be conceived through itself; in other words, the
    conception of one does not imply the conception of the other.

    III. Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the cause
    of the other.

    >>>>>Proof--If they have nothing in common, it follows that one
    cannot be apprehended by means of the other (Ax. v.), and,
    therefore, one cannot be the cause of the other (Ax. iv.).
    Q.E.D.

    IV. Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the
    other, either by the difference of the attributes of the
    substances, or by the difference of their modifications.

    >>>>>Proof--Everything which exists, exists either in itself or
    in something else (Ax. i.),-- that is (by Deff. iii. and v.),
    nothing is granted in addition to the understanding, except
    substance and its modifications. Nothing is, therefore, given
    besides the understanding, by which several things may be
    distinguished one from the other, except the substances, or, in
    other words (see Ax. iv.), their attributes and modifications.
    Q.E.D.

    V. There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances
    having the same nature or attribute.

    >>>>>Proof--If several distinct substances be granted, they must
    be distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of
    their attributes, or by the difference of their modifications
    (Prop. iv.). If only by the difference of their attributes, it
    will be granted that there cannot be more than one with an
    identical attribute. If by the difference of their
    modifications--as substance is naturally prior to its
    modifications (Prop. i.)--it follows that setting the
    modifications aside, and considering substance in itself, that is
    truly, (Deff. iii and vi.), there cannot be conceived one
    substance different from another--that is (by Prop. iv.), there
    cannot be granted several substances, but one substance only.
    Q.E.D.

    VI. One substance cannot be produced by another substance.

    >>>>>Proof--It is impossible that there should be in the universe
    two substances with an identical attribute, i.e. which have
    anything common to them both (Prop ii.), and, therefore (Prop.
    iii.), one cannot be the cause of the other, neither can one be
    produced by the other. Q.E.D.

    <<<<<VI. Corollary--Hence it follows that a substance cannot be
    produced by anything external to itself. For in the universe
    nothing is granted, save substances and their modifications (as
    appears from Ax. i. and Deff. iii. and v.). Now (by the last
    Prop.) substance cannot be produced by another substance,
    therefore it cannot be produced by anything external to itself.
    Q.E.D. This is shown still more readily by the absurdity of the
    contradictory. For, if substance be produced by an external
    cause, the knowledge of it would depend on the knowledge of its
    cause (Ax. iv.), and (by Deff. iii.) it would itself not be
    substance.

    VII. Existence belongs to the nature of substances.

    >>>>>Proof--Substance cannot be produced by anything external
    (Cor., Prop vi.), it must, therefore, be its own cause--that is,
    its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence belongs
    to its nature.

    VIII. Every substance is necessarily infinite.

    >>>>>Proof--There can only be one substance with an identical
    attribute, and existence follows from its nature (Prop. vii.);
    its nature, therefore, involves existence, either as finite or
    infinite. It does not exist as finite, for (by Deff. ii.) it
    would then be limited by something else of the same kind, which
    would also necessarily exist (Prop. vii.); and there would be two
    substances with an identical attribute, which is absurd (Prop.
    v.). It therefore exists as infinite. Q.E.D.

    *****Note I.--As finite existence involves a partial negation,
    and infinite existence is the absolute affirmation of the given
    nature, it follows (solely from Prop. vii.) that every substance
    is necessarily infinite.

    *****Note II.--No doubt it will be difficult for those who think
    about things loosely, and have not been accustomed to know them
    by their primary causes, to comprehend the demonstration of
    Prop. vii.: for such persons make no distinction between the
    modifications of substances and the substances themselves, and
    are ignorant of the manner in which things are produced; hence
    they may attribute to substances the beginning which they observe
    in natural objects. Those who are ignorant of true causes make
    complete confusion--think that trees might talk just as well as
    men--that men might be formed from stones as well as from seed;
    and imagine that any form might be changed into any other. So,
    also, those who confuse the two natures, divine and human,
    readily attribute human passions to the deity, especially so
    long as they do not know how passions originate in the mind.
    But, if people would consider the nature of substance, they would
    have no doubt about the truth of Prop. vii. In fact, this
    proposition would be a universal axiom, and accounted a truism.
    For, by substance, would be understood that which is in itself,
    and is conceived through itself--that is, something of which the
    conception requires not the conception of anything else; whereas
    modifications exist in something external to themselves, and a
    conception of them is formed by means of a conception of the
    things in which they exist. Therefore, we may have true ideas
    of non-existent modifications; for, although they may have no
    actual existence apart from the conceiving intellect, yet their
    essence is so involved in something external to themselves that
    they may through it be conceived. Whereas the only truth
    substances can have, external to the intellect, must consist in
    their existence, because they are conceived through themselves.
    Therefore, for a person to say that he has a clear and
    distinct--that is, a true--idea of a substance, but that he is
    not sure whether such substance exists, would be the same as if
    he said that he had a true idea, but was not sure whether or no
    it was false (a little consideration will make this plain); or if
    anyone affirmed that substance is created, it would be the same
    as saying that a false idea was true--in short, the height of
    absurdity. It must, then, necessarily be admitted that the
    existence of substance as its essence is an eternal truth. And
    we can hence conclude by another process of reasoning--that there
    is but one such substance. I think that this may profitably be
    done at once; and, in order to proceed regularly with the
    demonstration, we must premise:--

    +++++1. The true definition of a thing neither involves nor
    expresses anything beyond the nature of the thing defined. From
    this it follows that--

    +++++2. No definition implies or expresses a certain number of
    individuals, inasmuch as it expresses nothing beyond the nature
    of the thing defined. For instance, the definition of a triangle
    expresses nothing beyond the actual nature of a triangle: it
    does not imply any fixed number of triangles.

    +++++3. There is necessarily for each individual existent thing
    a cause why it should exist.

    +++++4. This cause of existence must either be contained in the
    nature and definition of the thing defined, or must be postulated
    apart from such definition.

    It therefore follows that, if a given number of individual things
    exist in nature, there must be some cause for the existence of
    exactly that number, neither more nor less. For example, if
    twenty men exist in the universe (for simplicity's sake, I will
    suppose them existing simultaneously, and to have had no
    predecessors), and we want to account for the existence of these
    twenty men, it will not be enough to show the cause of human
    existence in general; we must also show why there are exactly
    twenty men, neither more nor less: for a cause must be assigned
    for the existence of each individual. Now this cause cannot be
    contained in the actual nature of man, for the true definition of
    man does not involve any consideration of the number twenty.
    Consequently, the cause for the existence of these twenty men,
    and, consequently, of each of them, must necessarily be sought
    externally to each individual. Hence we may lay down the absolute
    rule, that everything which may consist of several individuals
    must have an external cause. And, as it has been shown already
    that existence appertains to the nature of substance, existence
    must necessarily be included in its definition; and from its
    definition alone existence must be deducible. But from its
    definition (as we have shown, Notes ii., iii.), we cannot infer
    the existence of several substances; therefore it follows that
    there is only one substance of the same nature. Q.E.D.

    IX. The more reality or being a thing has, the greater the
    number of its attributes (Def. iv.).

    X. Each particular attribute of the one substance must be
    conceived through itself.

    >>>>>Proof--An attribute is that which the intellect perceives of
    substance, as constituting its essence (Def. iv.), and,
    therefore, must be conceived through itself (Def. iii.). Q.E.D.

    *****Note--It is thus evident that, though two attributes are, in
    fact, conceived as distinct--that is, one without the help of the
    other--yet we cannot, therefore, conclude that they constitute
    two entities, or two different substances. For it is the nature
    of substance that each of its attributes is conceived through
    itself, inasmuch as all the attributes it has have always existed
    simultaneously in it, and none could be produced by any other;
    but each expresses the reality or being of substance. It is,
    then, far from an absurdity to ascribe several attributes to one
    substance: for nothing in nature is more clear than that each
    and every entity must be conceived under some attribute, and that
    its reality or being is in proportion to the number of its
    attributes expressing necessity or eternity and infinity.
    Consequently it is abundantly clear, that an absolutely infinite
    being must necessarily be defined as consisting in infinite
    attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and
    infinite essence.

    If anyone now ask, by what sign shall he be able to distinguish
    different substances, let him read the following propositions,
    which show that there is but one substance in the universe, and
    that it is absolutely infinite, wherefore such a sign would be
    sought in vain.

    XI. God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, of
    which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality,
    necessarily exists.

    >>>>>Proof--If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that God
    does not exist: then his essence does not involve existence.
    But this (Prop. vii.) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily
    exists.

    >>>>>Another proof--Of everything whatsoever a cause or reason
    must be assigned, either for its existence, or for its
    non-existence--e.g. if a triangle exist, a reason or cause must
    be granted for its existence; if, on the contrary, it does not
    exist, a cause must also be granted, which prevents it from
    existing, or annuls its existence. This reason or cause must
    either be contained in the nature of the thing in question, or be
    external to it. For instance, the reason for the non-existence
    of a square circle is indicated in its nature, namely, because it
    would involve a contradiction. On the other hand, the existence
    of substance follows also solely from its nature, inasmuch as its
    nature involves existence. (See Prop. vii.)

    But the reason for the existence of a triangle or a circle does
    not follow from the nature of those figures, but from the order
    of universal nature in extension. From the latter it must
    follow, either that a triangle necessarily exists, or that it is
    impossible that it should exist. So much is self-evident. It
    follows therefrom that a thing necessarily exists, if no cause or
    reason be granted which prevents its existence.

    If, then, no cause or reason can be given, which prevents the
    existence of God, or which destroys his existence, we must
    certainly conclude that he necessarily does exist. If such a
    reason or cause should be given, it must either be drawn from the
    very nature of God, or be external to him--that is, drawn from
    another substance of another nature. For if it were of the same
    nature, God, by that very fact, would be admitted to exist. But
    substance of another nature could have nothing in common with God
    (by Prop. ii.), and therefore would be unable either to cause or
    to destroy his existence.

    As, then, a reason or cause which would annul the divine
    existence cannot be drawn from anything external to the divine
    nature, such cause must perforce, if God does not exist, be drawn
    from God's own nature, which would involve a contradiction. To
    make such an affirmation about a being absolutely infinite and
    supremely perfect is absurd; therefore, neither in the nature of
    God, nor externally to his nature, can a cause or reason be
    assigned which would annul his existence. Therefore, God
    necessarily exists. Q.E.D.

    >>>>>Another proof--The potentiality of non-existence is a
    negation of power, and contrariwise the potentiality of existence
    is a power, as is obvious. If, then, that which necessarily
    exists is nothing but finite beings, such finite beings are more
    powerful than a being absolutely infinite, which is obviously
    absurd; therefore, either nothing exists, or else a being
    absolutely infinite necessarily exists also. Now we exist either
    in ourselves, or in something else which necessarily exists (see
    Ax. i. and Prop. vii.). Therefore a being absolutely
    infinite--in other words, God (Def. vi.)--necessarily exists.
    Q.E.D.

    *****Note--In this last proof, I have purposely shown God's
    existence 'a posteriori,' so that the proof might be more easily
    followed, not because, from the same premises, God's existence
    does not follow 'a priori.' For, as the potentiality of
    existence is a power, it follows that, in proportion as reality
    increases in the nature of a thing, so also will it increase its
    strength for existence. Therefore a being absolutely infinite,
    such as God, has from himself an absolutely infinite power of
    existence, and hence he does absolutely exist. Perhaps there will
    be many who will be unable to see the force of this proof,
    inasmuch as they are accustomed only to consider those things
    which flow from external causes. Of such things, they see that
    those which quickly come to pass--that is, quickly come into
    existence--quickly also disappear; whereas they regard as more
    difficult of accomplishment --that is, not so easily brought into
    existence--those things which they conceive as more complicated.

    However, to do away with this misconception, I need not here show
    the measure of truth in the proverb, "What comes quickly, goes
    quickly," nor discuss whether, from the point of view of
    universal nature, all things are equally easy, or otherwise: I
    need only remark that I am not here speaking of things, which
    come to pass through causes external to themselves, but only of
    substances which (by Prop. vi.) cannot be produced by any
    external cause. Things which are produced by external causes,
    whether they consist of many parts or few, owe whatsoever
    perfection or reality they possess solely to the efficacy of
    their external cause; wherefore the existence of substance must
    arise solely from its own nature, which is nothing else but its
    essence. Thus, the perfection of a thing does not annul its
    existence, but, on the contrary, asserts it. Imperfection, on
    the other hand, does annul it; therefore we cannot be more
    certain of the existence of anything, than of the existence of a
    being absolutely infinite or perfect--that is, of God. For
    inasmuch as his essence excludes all imperfection, and involves
    absolute perfection, all cause for doubt concerning his existence
    is done away, and the utmost certainty on the question is given.
    This, I think, will be evident to every moderately attentive
    reader.

    XII. No attribute of substance can be conceived from which it
    would follow that substance can be divided.

    >>>>>Proof--The parts into which substance as thus conceived
    would be divided either will retain the nature of substance, or
    they will not. If the former, then (by Prop. viii.) each part
    will necessarily be infinite, and (by Prop vi.) self-caused, and
    (by Prop. v.) will perforce consist of a different attribute, so
    that, in that case, several substances could be formed out of one
    substance, which (by Prop. vi.) is absurd. Moreover, the parts
    (by Prop. ii.) would have nothing in common with their whole, and
    the whole (by Def. iv. and Prop. X) could both exist and be
    conceived without its parts, which everyone will admit to be
    absurd. If we adopt the second alternative--namely, that the
    parts will not retain the nature of substance--then, if the
    whole substance were divided into equal parts, it would lose the
    nature of substance, and would cease to exist, which (by Prop.
    vii.) is absurd.

    XIII. Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.

    >>>>>Proof--If it could be divided, the parts into which it was
    divided would either retain the nature of absolutely infinite
    substance, or they would not. If the former, we should have
    several substances of the same nature, which (by Prop. v.) is
    absurd. If the latter, then (by Prop. vii.) substance
    absolutely infinite could cease to exist, which (by Prop. xi.) is
    also absurd.

    <<<<<Corollary--It follows that no substance, and consequently no
    extended substance, in so far as it is substance, is divisible.

    *****Note--The indivisibility of substance may be more easily
    understood as follows. The nature of substance can only be
    conceived as infinite, and by a part of substance, nothing else
    can be understood than finite substance, which (by Prop. viii.)
    involves a manifest contradiction.

    XIV. Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.

    >>>>>Proof--As God is a being absolutely infinite, of whom no
    attribute that expresses the essence of substance can be denied
    (by Def. vi.), and he necessarily exists (by Prop. xi.); if any
    substance besides God were granted, it would have to be explained
    by some attribute of God, and thus two substances with the same
    attribute would exist, which (by Prop. v.) is absurd; therefore,
    besides God no substance can be granted, or consequently be
    conceived. If it could be conceived, it would necessarily have to
    be conceived as existent; but this (by the first part of this
    proof) is absurd. Therefore, besides God no substance can be
    granted or conceived. Q.E.D.

    <<<<<Corollary I.--Clearly, therefore: 1. God is one, that is
    (by Def. vi.) only one substance can be granted in the universe,
    and that substance is absolutely infinite, as we have already
    indicated (in the note to Prop. x.).

    <<<<<Corollary II.--It follows: 2. That extension and thought
    are either attributes of God or (by Ax. i.) accidents
    ("affectiones") of the attributes of God.

    XV. Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or
    be conceived.

    >>>>>Proof--Besides God, no substance is granted or can be
    conceived (by Prop. xiv.), that is (by Def. iii.) nothing which
    is in itself and is conceived through itself. But modes (by Def.
    v.) can neither be, nor be conceived without substance;
    wherefore they can only be in the divine nature, and can only
    through it be conceived. But substances and modes form the sum
    total of existence (by Ax. i.), therefore, without God nothing
    can be, or be conceived. Q.E.D.
    Can't you all see this to be true?
    "Hey Capa -- We're only stardust." ~ "Sunshine"

    “Pleasure to me is wonder—the unexplored, the unexpected, the thing that is hidden and the changeless thing that lurks behind superficial mutability. To trace the remote in the immediate; the eternal in the ephemeral; the past in the present; the infinite in the finite; these are to me the springs of delight and beauty.” ~ H.P. Lovecraft

  6. #36
    @.~*virinaĉo*~.@ Totenkindly's Avatar
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    *****Note--Some assert that God, like a man, consists of body and
    mind, and is susceptible of passions. How far such persons have
    strayed from the truth is sufficiently evident from what has been
    said. But these I pass over. For all who have in anywise
    reflected on the divine nature deny that God has a body. Of this
    they find excellent proof in the fact that we understand by body
    a definite quantity, so long, so broad, so deep, bounded by a
    certain shape, and it is the height of absurdity to predicate
    such a thing of God, a being absolutely infinite. But meanwhile
    by other reasons with which they try to prove their point, they
    show that they think corporeal or extended substance wholly apart
    from the divine nature, and say it was created by God. Wherefrom
    the divine nature can have been created, they are wholly
    ignorant; thus they clearly show that they do not know the
    meaning of their own words. I myself have proved sufficiently
    clearly, at any rate in my own judgment (Cor. Prop. vi., and Note
    2, Prop. viii.), that no substance can be produced or created by
    anything other than itself. Further, I showed (in Prop. xiv.)
    that besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.
    Hence we drew the conclusion that extended substance is one of
    the infinite attributes of God. However, in order to explain
    more fully, I will refute the arguments of my adversaries, which
    all start from the following points:--

    Extended substance, in so far as it is substance, consists, as
    they think, in parts, wherefore they deny that it can be
    infinite, or consequently, that it can appertain to God. This
    they illustrate with many examples, of which I will take one or
    two. If extended substance, they say, is infinite, let it be
    conceived to be divided into two parts; each part will then be
    either finite or infinite. If the former, then infinite
    substance is composed of two finite parts, which is absurd. If
    the latter, then one infinite will be twice as large as another
    infinite, which is also absurd.

    Further, if an infinite line be measured out in foot lengths, it
    will consist of an infinite number of such parts; it would
    equally consist of an infinite number of parts, if each part
    measured only an inch: therefore, one infinity would be twelve
    times as great as the other.

    Lastly, if from a single point there be conceived to be drawn two
    diverging lines which at first are at a definite distance apart,
    but are produced to infinity, it is certain that the distance
    between the two lines will be continually increased, until at
    length it changes from definite to indefinable. As these
    absurdities follow, it is said, from considering quantity as
    infinite, the conclusion is drawn that extended substance must
    necessarily be finite, and, consequently, cannot appertain to the
    nature of God.

    The second argument is also drawn from God's supreme perfection.
    God, it is said, inasmuch as he is a supremely perfect being,
    cannot be passive; but extended substance, insofar as it is
    divisible, is passive. It follows, therefore, that extended
    substance does not appertain to the essence of God.

    Such are the arguments I find on the subject in writers, who by
    them try to prove that extended substance is unworthy of the
    divine nature, and cannot possibly appertain thereto. However, I
    think an attentive reader will see that I have already answered
    their propositions; for all their arguments are founded on the
    hypothesis that extended substance is composed of parts, and such
    a hypothesis I have shown (Prop. xii., and Cor. Prop. xiii.) to
    be absurd. Moreover, anyone who reflects will see that all these
    absurdities (if absurdities they be, which I am not now
    discussing), from which it is sought to extract the conclusion
    that extended substance is finite, do not at all follow from the
    notion of an infinite quantity, but merely from the notion that
    an infinite quantity is measurable, and composed of finite parts:
    therefore, the only fair conclusion to be drawn is that infinite
    quantity is not measurable, and cannot be composed of finite
    parts. This is exactly what we have already proved (in Prop.
    xii.). Wherefore the weapon which they aimed at us has in
    reality recoiled upon themselves. If, from this absurdity of
    theirs, they persist in drawing the conclusion that extended
    substance must be finite, they will in good sooth be acting like
    a man who asserts that circles have the properties of squares,
    and, finding himself thereby landed in absurdities, proceeds to
    deny that circles have any center, from which all lines drawn to
    the circumference are equal. For, taking extended substance,
    which can only be conceived as infinite, one, and indivisible
    (Props. viii., v., xii.) they assert, in order to prove that it
    is finite, that it is composed of finite parts, and that it can
    be multiplied and divided.

    So, also, others, after asserting that a line is composed of
    points, can produce many arguments to prove that a line cannot be
    infinitely divided. Assuredly it is not less absurd to assert
    that extended substance is made up of bodies or parts, than it
    would be to assert that a solid is made up of surfaces, a surface
    of lines, and a line of points. This must be admitted by all who
    know clear reason to be infallible, and most of all by those who
    deny the possibility of a vacuum. For if extended substance
    could be so divided that its parts were really separate, why
    should not one part admit of being destroyed, the others
    remaining joined together as before? And why should all be so
    fitted into one another as to leave no vacuum? Surely in the
    case of things, which are really distinct one from the other, one
    can exist without the other, and can remain in its original
    condition. As, then, there does not exist a vacuum in nature (of
    which anon), but all parts are bound to come together to prevent
    it, it follows from this that the parts cannot really be
    distinguished, and that extended substance in so far as it is
    substance cannot be divided.

    If anyone asks me the further question, Why are we naturally so
    prone to divide quantity? I answer, that quantity is conceived by
    us in two ways; in the abstract and superficially, as we imagine
    it; or as substance, as we conceive it solely by the intellect.
    If, then, we regard quantity as it is represented in our
    imagination, which we often and more easily do, we shall find
    that it is finite, divisible, and compounded of parts; but if we
    regard it as it is represented in our intellect, and conceive it
    as substance, which it is very difficult to do, we shall then, as
    I have sufficiently proved, find that it is infinite, one, and
    indivisible. This will be plain enough to all who make a
    distinction between the intellect and the imagination,
    especially if it be remembered that matter is everywhere the
    same, that its parts are not distinguishable, except in so far as
    we conceive matter as diversely modified, whence its parts are
    distinguished, not really, but modally. For instance, water, in
    so far as it is water, we conceive to be divided, and its parts
    to be separated one from the other; but not in so far as it is
    extended substance; from this point of view it is neither
    separated nor divisible. Further, water, in so far as it is
    water, is produced and corrupted; but, in so far as it is
    substance, it is neither produced nor corrupted.

    I think I have now answered the second argument; it is, in fact,
    founded on the same assumption as the first--namely, that matter,
    in so far as it is substance, is divisible, and composed of
    parts. Even if it were so, I do not know why it should be
    considered unworthy of the divine nature, inasmuch as besides God
    (by Prop. xiv.) no substance can be granted, wherefrom it could
    receive its modifications. All things, I repeat, are in God, and
    all things which come to pass, come to pass solely through the
    laws of the infinite nature of God, and follow (as I will shortly
    show) from the necessity of his essence. Wherefore it can in
    nowise be said that God is passive in respect to anything other
    than himself, or that extended substance is unworthy of the
    divine nature, even if it be supposed divisible, so long as it is
    granted to be infinite and eternal. But enough of this for the
    present.

    XVI. From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an
    infinite number of things in infinite ways--that is, all things
    which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.

    >>>>>Proof--This proposition will be clear to everyone, who
    remembers that from the given definition of any thing the
    intellect infers several properties, which really necessarily
    follow therefrom (that is, from the actual essence of the thing
    defined); and it infers more properties in proportion as the
    definition of the thing expresses more reality, that is, in
    proportion as the essence of the thing defined involves more
    reality. Now, as the divine nature has absolutely infinite
    attributes (by Def. vi.), of which each expresses infinite
    essence after its kind, it follows that from the necessity of its
    nature an infinite number of things (that is, everything which
    can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect) must
    necessarily follow. Q.E.D.

    <<<<<Corollary I.--Hence it follows, that God is the efficient
    cause of all that can fall within the sphere of an infinite
    intellect.

    <<<<<Corollary II.--It also follows that God is a cause in
    himself, and not through an accident of his nature.

    <<<<<Corollary III.--It follows, thirdly, that God is the
    absolutely first cause.

    XVII. God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and is not
    constrained by anyone.

    >>>>>Proof--We have just shown (in Prop. xvi.), that solely from
    the necessity of the divine nature, or, what is the same thing,
    solely from the laws of his nature, an infinite number of things
    absolutely follow in an infinite number of ways; and we proved
    (in Prop. xv.), that without God nothing can be nor be conceived;
    but that all things are in God. Wherefore nothing can exist
    outside himself, whereby he can be conditioned or constrained to
    act. Wherefore God acts solely by the laws of his own nature,
    and is not constrained by anyone. Q.E.D.

    <<<<<Corollary I--It follows: 1. That there can be no cause
    which, either extrinsically or intrinsically, besides the
    perfection of his own nature, moves God to act.

    <<<<<Corollary II--It follows: 2. That God is the sole free
    cause. For God alone exists by the sole necessity of his nature
    (by Prop. xi. and Prop. xiv., Cor. i.), and acts by the sole
    necessity of his own nature, wherefore God is (by Def. vii.) the
    sole free cause. Q.E.D.

    *****Note--Others think that God is a free cause, because he can,
    as they think, bring it about, that those things which we have
    said follow from his nature--that is, which are in his power,
    should not come to pass, or should not be produced by him. But
    this is the same as if they said, that God could bring it about,
    that it should follow from the nature of a triangle that its
    three interior angles should not be equal to two right angles; or
    that from a given cause no effect should follow, which is absurd.

    Moreover, I will show below, without the aid of this
    proposition, that neither intellect nor will appertain to God's
    nature. I know that there are many who think that they can show,
    that supreme intellect and free will do appertain to God's
    nature; for they say they know of nothing more perfect, which
    they can attribute to God, than that which is the highest
    perfection in ourselves. Further, although they conceive God as
    actually supremely intelligent, they yet do not believe that he
    can bring into existence everything which he actually
    understands, for they think that they would thus destroy God's
    power. If, they contend, God had created everything which is in
    his intellect, he would not be able to create anything more, and
    this, they think, would clash with God's omnipotence; therefore,
    they prefer to asset that God is indifferent to all things, and
    that he creates nothing except that which he has decided, by some
    absolute exercise of will, to create. However, I think I have
    shown sufficiently clearly (by Prop. xvi.) that from God's
    supreme power, or infinite nature, an infinite number of
    things--that is, all things have necessarily flowed forth in an
    infinite number of ways, or always flow from the same necessity;
    in the same way as from the nature of a triangle it follows from
    eternity and for eternity, that its three interior angles are
    equal to two right angles. Wherefore the omnipotence of God has
    been displayed from all eternity, and will for all eternity
    remain in the same state of activity. This manner of treating the
    question attributes to God an omnipotence, in my opinion, far
    more perfect. For, otherwise, we are compelled to confess that
    God understands an infinite number of creatable things, which he
    will never be able to create, for, if he created all that he
    understands, he would, according to this showing, exhaust his
    omnipotence, and render himself imperfect. Wherefore, in order
    to establish that God is perfect, we should be reduced to
    establishing at the same time, that he cannot bring to pass
    everything over which his power extends; this seems to be a
    hypothesis most absurd, and most repugnant to God's omnipotence.

    Further (to say a word concerning the intellect and the will
    which we attribute to God), if intellect and will appertain to
    the eternal essence of God, we must take these words in some
    significance quite different from those they usually bear. For
    intellect and will, which should constitute the essence of God,
    would perforce be as far apart as the poles from the human
    intellect and will, in fact, would have nothing in common with
    them but the name; there would be about as much correspondence
    between the two as there is between the Dog, the heavenly
    constellation, and a dog, an animal that barks. This I will
    prove as follows. If intellect belongs to the divine nature, it
    cannot be in nature, as ours is generally thought to be,
    posterior to, or simultaneous with the things understood,
    inasmuch as God is prior to all things by reason of his causality
    (Prop. xvi., Cor. i.). On the contrary, the truth and formal
    essence of things is as it is, because it exists by
    representation as such in the intellect of God. Wherefore the
    intellect of God, in so far as it is conceived to constitute
    God's essence, is, in reality, the cause of things, both of their
    essence and of their existence. This seems to have been
    recognized by those who have asserted, that God's intellect,
    God's will, and God's power, are one and the same. As,
    therefore, God's intellect is the sole cause of things, namely,
    both of their essence and existence, it must necessarily differ
    from them in respect to its essence, and in respect to its
    existence. For a cause differs from a thing it causes,
    precisely in the quality which the latter gains from the former.

    For example, a man is the cause of another man's existence, but
    not of his essence (for the latter is an eternal truth), and,
    therefore, the two men may be entirely similar in essence, but
    must be different in existence; and hence if the existence of one
    of them cease, the existence of the other will not necessarily
    cease also; but if the essence of one could be destroyed, and be
    made false, the essence of the other would be destroyed also.
    Wherefore, a thing which is the cause both of the essence and of
    the existence of a given effect, must differ from such effect
    both in respect to its essence, and also in respect to its
    existence. Now the intellect of God is the cause both of the
    essence and the existence of our intellect; therefore, the
    intellect of God in so far as it is conceived to constitute the
    divine essence, differs from our intellect both in respect to
    essence and in respect to existence, nor can it in anywise agree
    therewith save in name, as we said before. The reasoning would
    be identical in the case of the will, as anyone can easily see.

    XVIII. God is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all
    things. >>>>>Proof--All things which are, are in God, and must be
    conceived through God (by Prop. xv.), therefore (by Prop. xvi.,
    Cor. i.) God is the cause of those things which are in him.
    This is our first point. Further, besides God there can be no
    substance (by Prop. xiv.), that is nothing in itself external to
    God. This is our second point. God, therefore, is the
    indwelling and not the transient cause of all things. Q.E.D.

    XIX. God, and all the attributes of God, are eternal.
    >>>>>Proof--God (by Def. vi.) is substance, which (by Prop. xi.)
    necessarily exists, that is (by Prop. vii.) existence appertains
    to its nature, or (what is the same thing) follows from its
    definition; therefore, God is eternal (by Def. vii.). Further,
    by the attributes of God we must understand that which (by Def.
    iv.) expresses the essence of the divine substance--in other
    words, that which appertains to substance: that, I say, should
    be involved in the attributes of substance. Now eternity
    appertains to the nature of substance (as I have already shown in
    Prop. vii.); therefore, eternity must appertain to each of the
    attributes, and thus all are eternal. Q.E.D.

    *****Note--This proposition is also evident from the manner in
    which (in Prop. xi.) I demonstrated the existence of God; it is
    evident, I repeat, from that proof, that the existence of God,
    like his essence, is an eternal truth. Further (in Prop. xix. of
    my "Principles of the Cartesian Philosophy"), I have proved the
    eternity of God, in another manner, which I need not here
    repeat.

    XX. The existence of God and his essence are one and the same.

    >>>>>Proof--God (by the last Prop.) and all his attributes are
    eternal, that is (by Def. viii.) each of his attributes expresses
    existence. Therefore the same attributes of God which explain
    his eternal essence, explain at the same time his eternal
    existence--in other words, that which constitutes God's essence
    constitutes at the same time his existence. Wherefore God's
    existence and God's essence are one and the same. Q.E.D.
    I hope you all see my point.
    (please do not bother to respond, your issues no doubt will be senseless and failing to address the main point of my quotes!)
    "Hey Capa -- We're only stardust." ~ "Sunshine"

    “Pleasure to me is wonder—the unexplored, the unexpected, the thing that is hidden and the changeless thing that lurks behind superficial mutability. To trace the remote in the immediate; the eternal in the ephemeral; the past in the present; the infinite in the finite; these are to me the springs of delight and beauty.” ~ H.P. Lovecraft

  7. #37
    Nips away your dignity Fluffywolf's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Jennifer View Post
    I hope you all see my point.
    (please do not bother to respond, your issues no doubt will be senseless and failing to address the main point of my quotes!)
    A train is a connected series of vehicles for rail transport that move along a track (permanent way) to transport freight or passengers from one place to another. The track usually consists of two rails, but might also be a monorail or maglev guideway.
    ~Self-depricating Megalomaniacal Superwolf

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    Head Pigeon Mad Hatter's Avatar
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    Default Lesson 3: The strawman argument

    Quote Originally Posted by Fluffywolf View Post
    Don't start too big. Try trolling an NF first before you attempt to take on an NT. I really don't want to discourage you so soon.
    What's your problem man? You think I can't put up with you? Sure, let's poke the little emo kid a bit because he can't defend himself. It would really help the discussion if you let go off your patronizing tone.
    THen again, I'm not surprised to see that coming from an NT. I've so had it with your constant negative stereotyping against NFs and INFPs in particular. And you call yourself rational. That's just plain pathetic.
    IN SERIO FATVITAS.

    -τὸ γὰρ γράμμα ἀποκτέννει, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ζῳοποιεῖ-

  9. #39
    Senior Member tinkerbell's Avatar
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    I'm confused.. this is still the trolling thread?

  10. #40
    Nips away your dignity Fluffywolf's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Avis View Post
    What's your problem man? You think I can't put up with you? Sure, let's poke the little emo kid a bit because he can't defend himself. It would really help the discussion if you let go off your patronizing tone.
    THen again, I'm not surprised to see that coming from an NT. I've so had it with your constant negative stereotyping against NFs and INFPs in particular. And you call yourself rational. That's just plain pathetic.
    Look, okay, fine. I'll be helpful, alright.

    If you really, really want to learn about how to troll, just follow the guide in this movie. You'll be rivaling the awesomeness of NT superiority in no time. And become one of the few NF's that are truely capable of standing amongst the ranks of the great.

    I give you this, because I personally don't care about trolling, nor about selling out my fellow troll NT's. If they can't deal with it, it's their own fault, no?

    Go forth, click and win at trolling, my INFP friend.

    YouTube - Win at trolling, guide
    ~Self-depricating Megalomaniacal Superwolf

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