Theories of Truth

[Didums]

His approach is irrelevent. All that is relevent are his ideas, and whether or not they are true.

So, if his approach is just making random conjectures it makes no difference? He can randomly guess that the earth revolves around the sun, and in this case his idea seems to be true though he came to it through no reasoning whatsoever. He may be speaking the truth, but he cannot prove his idea to others in this method.

 

[ThatsWhatHeSaid]

The goal of science is to predict through careful observation, and to be able to predict events in a given context is to know the truth to some extent. The goal of philosophy is to reason the truth through logical inquiry, and to be able to reason the truth logically one may be able to predict. (I haven't taken philosophy yet but this is how I understand it)

Already you're in trouble, because you're using truth as if it's this absolute thing. The point is that what one person calls "Truth" may not correspond to what another person calls "Truth." And in the same way, their methods for excavating their respective "Truths" can differ. One can start to argue that the other doesn't have the "right" methods for finding real truth, but his argument is pointless because they're both talking about different things. No one's right and no one's wrong in their definition because Truth has no inherent definition; the definition is up to the person using it.

The post above this one has the same issue.

 

[Didums]

Already you're in trouble, because you're using truth as if it's this absolute thing. The point is that what one person calls "Truth" may not correspond to what another person calls "Truth." And in the same way, their methods for excavating their respective "Truths" can differ. One can start to argue that the other doesn't have the "right" methods for finding real truth, but his argument is pointless because they're both talking about different things. No one's right and no one's wrong in their definition because Truth has no inherent definition; the definition is up to the person using it.

The post above this one has the same issue.

In my other posts I demonstrated that I understand that completely. Of course there is no "ultimate truth", our perception is too limited to conjure up such a thing, and it could only be interpreted subjectively through our narrow range of objective methods.

What I'm saying is exactly that truths only apply to given contexts and certain methods, that truths in one field may not coincide with truths in another. It doesn't diminish the meaning of the truths, just confines them to their subject matter.

 

[Night]

His approach is irrelevent. All that is relevent are his ideas, and whether or not they are true.

I retract my earlier statement about us speaking to different topics.

Your later points underline this distinction.

Scientist v. Philosopher is moot. Each position I offered describes semantic qualifications of truth, as a negotiable/divisible entity depending on intellectual heritage.

As a sidebar, this realization comes as something of an ironic illustration of your apparent point.

 

[ThatsWhatHeSaid]

Of course there is no "ultimate truth", our perception is too limited to conjure up such a thing, and it could only be interpreted subjectively through our narrow range of objective methods.

I don't think that's what's being. This is a semantic issue, not a epistemic issue. It's not that there's no objective reality because we have a problem with our perception or anything near that. It's that when I use the word truth, I may be talking about something different from what you're talking about, like the pencil/key analogy.

 

[Didums]

I don't think that's what's being. This is a semantic issue, not a epistemic issue. It's not that there's no objective reality because we have a problem with our perception or anything near that. It's that when I use the word truth, I may be talking about something different from what you're talking about, like the pencil/key analogy.

Hence:

truths only apply to given contexts and certain methods, that truths in one field may not coincide with truths in another. It doesn't diminish the meaning of the truths, just confines them to their subject matter.

Like how Quantum Mechanics and General Relativity do not agree on Black Holes.

 

[ThatsWhatHeSaid]

Hence:

Like how Quantum Mechanics and General Relativity do not agree on Black Holes.

But in that example, both fields have adopted the same theory of "truth" (correspondence) haven't they? Both are saying "we believe something is true when it corresponds to reality." One field predicts that A corresponds, another predicts B. Both are using the same theory because they agree on the same definition of truth. There's no semantic disagreement here.

 

[Didums]

So, if one group comes together and says "We believe black holes exist because we observe their effects on spacetime and energy" and another group says "We believe black holes don't exist because it is logically impossible to fit an increasing amount of matter into a single point" thats the kind of disagreement you speak of?

 

[Nocapszy]

[Note: I have posted something very similar to this somewhere on MBTICentral before; this is a rewritten version.]

Suppose that a scientist is searching for theories which correspond to the facts, and by convention he labels such theories 'true.' One day a philosopher asks the scientist whether he has succeeded. Although the scientist has discovered some useful theories, each has its problems and he does not think any are true. But the scientist is then told by the philosopher that his theories must be true. He is then convinced by the philosopher that a theory is not true because it corresponds to the facts, but because it has instrumental value.

Does this mean that, if a fact is such that there's a land where no man can ever see, or interact with, then the theory based on that fact is untrue, simply because there can't be any instrumental value?

Disabused of the correspondence theory of truth, the scientist now adopts to the pragmatic theory of truth. Prior to his conversion, the scientist’s search for truth meant searching for theories which correspond to the facts, but now that is replaced by a search for theories with instrumental value.

But is this a sensible move by the scientist? The original aim of the scientist's search was the discovery of theories which correspond to the facts, and even though he may no longer label such theories 'true,' nothing else need change.

Suppose that the scientist lost his car keys and searched thoroughly to no avail. The philosopher then convinces him that the word 'key' really refers to a writing utensil, and therefore, advises that he search for that instead.

The philosopher is a wily bastard isn't he?
The scientist seems not to have much wit*: How certain are you that he's not a scientologist?

...

In any case --
The scientologist doesn't recognize that what the car needs remains the same even since the philosopher re-routed the scientologist's vocabulary.

What's the point of this part of the story? Even after having read, several times, the next section of your post, I fail to see what sense you're trying to make.

Words do not have real or essential meanings. For example, the word 'post' can refer to many different things--including a piece of wood set upright into the ground as a marker, a starting point at a racetrack, or an electronic message sent to a forum. But do these alternative interpretations constitute theories of post? Would it be sensible to argue about which theory of post is correct? The meaning a word is not a matter of discovering its real or essential meaning, but of negotiating a conventional use and interpretation. And although this principle is uncontroversial regarding words like 'key' and 'post,' it is often forgotten when discussing the word 'truth.'

And what a nasty problem this is.

So then, you mean to say that...
What the fuck are you saying? I'm searching with difficulty for cohesion.
You've misaligned an analogy.



*The scient(olog)ist has theories based on facts that don't correspond with the results -- facts that would follow experimentation: other facts. So his theory must be based on the wrong facts. Or too few of them.
So he doesn't really have theories based on facts.
He has theories based on incomplete data, otherwise they would correspond to the world, which was, I remember, his original intention, with invariable accuracy and this entire discussion would never breathed its first breath.
On top of that, he trusts a philosopher, who, no doubt, works in construction, and dismisses the notion of his failure and, instead of correcting his theories so that they're not only proven right, and are based on facts.
This entire incident is highly akin to the problems struck out by euphemism.

 

[ThatsWhatHeSaid]

So, if one group comes together and says "We believe black holes exist because we observe their effects on spacetime and energy" and another group says "We believe black holes don't exist because it is logically impossible to fit an increasing amount of matter into a single point" thats the kind of disagreement you speak of?

I think it would be more like one person saying that black holes exist because we have evidence for them (correspondence), while the other person says black holes exist because they make our theories of the universe more coherent (pragmatic).

Superstring theory is a good example. We don't have evidence for them, but they make physics more coherent and elegant. The pragmatists would say "this is truth because it helps us understand the world better." The correpondence theorists would say "that's not truth because there's no evidence." At least, this would be the case if the 2 paragraphs I skimmed in Wikipedia were well-written.

 

[Maabus1999]

Truth in Science relies on your Senses. Therefore is it the science that is true? Or your senses?

Theories in Science rely on mathematics. Mathematics is a descriptive alphabet, but again only descriptive. It does not make it true.

Philosophy does not rely on senses but instead thought. Thought always seems true but its description comes from our senses.

Anything formed from our senses can actually be false.

Philosophy pursues the truth.
Science pursues the truth.
Both seek to understand our senses.
Different roads.
Same destination.
Neither guarantee you will reach the destination.

 

[reason]

Truth in Science relies on your Senses. Therefore is it the science that is true? Or your senses?

Or is it truth that is true? Who can say? When are the chickens returning? The mystery is unabated. How does Wildcat do it?

 

[SolitaryWalker]

Or is it truth that is true? Who can say? When are the chickens returning? The mystery is unabated. How does Wildcat do it?

Quite simply, define the terms for the present discourse. In this case we say, this is what 'truth' is going to mean in this context and only in this context. We make no attempt to establish how this term is to be used in all contexts. But regarding this discourse, whoever does not use it in the way it has been defined here is disqualified from participating.

Your point however is clear, we do indeed attribute many different meanings to the same word. This means that we need to explain clearly and thoroughly how we are using each word.

 

[Nocapszy]

Sir reason, I demand you address me!

 

[SolitaryWalker]

Sir reason, I demand you address me!

Illustrious one, rely primarily on Ti and not Ne if you wish for your further attention whoring attempts in threads like these to be successful!

 

[Nocapszy]

I prefer both simultaneously.
Its possible. I've seen it.

The later portion of my post...
No wait I got a better one: This isn't your battle bluejob. And save the type jargon for the type threads.
As clever as you must think yourself, I see through the silliness that Ti is capable of attention whoring.
Nice try but my habits will continue.
Tune in next time when PT and BlueDog try, and fail, to deglorify my unquestionably great habits.

 

[SolitaryWalker]

I prefer both simultaneously.
Its possible. I've seen it.

The later portion of my post...
No wait I got a better one: This isn't your battle bluejob. And save the type jargon for the type threads.
As clever as you must think yourself, I see through the silliness that Ti is capable of attention whoring.
Nice try but my habits will continue.
Tune in next time when PT and BlueDog try, and fail, to deglorify my unquestionably great habits.

Ti people may attention whore by virtue of their Feeling faculty, as the Feeling function is the only one that directly connects to the human element. Ti in itself, however, cannot.

You can use both simultaneously, however, it is inevitable that one would be relied upon heavier than the other as the two contrapose each other on certain levels (for example one is perceiving, the other insists on cessation of input of new information in order to organize the previously registered information). You can rely on both to a satisfactory degree if you are good at such a skill, however because you are not, it is best that you make a conscious effort of relying on one significantly more than the other.

Once you have shown an ability to handle your non-primary function well whilst making little conscious effort to curb the influence of the primary, you may take the training wheels off, but I do not see that coming for you in the near future.

 

[reason]

Sir reason, I demand you address me!

Hello

 

[ygolo]

Creating a theory of truth, I think is a perhaps an unsolvable problem.

Of all our concepts, truth may be our most basic.

Ultimately, conceptualization is about labeling and categorizing, and we either implicitly or explicitly care about truth during conceptualization.

So, when we conceptualize about correspondence, utility, coherence, and other such things, we will still at base need to consider what we mean by true (or perhaps just not true, provably true, or provably untrue, or something else).

You may be interested in category theory. It forms the basis of about how I think about epistemology. I'm too sleepy to explain now, and I would almost definitely have to resort to diagrams.

 

[Nocapszy]

Once you have shown an ability to handle your non-primary function well whilst making little conscious effort to curb the influence of the primary, you may take the training wheels off, but I do not see that coming for you in the near future.

Apart from you being wrong, I can point out that I don't care whether I have your permission.
I wonder if you think you're very good at it either...
I can never help myself but wonder where the confused notion that I have any interest in making sure you understand what I have to say came from. You and The Poriferan share this problem.
Here's a tip -- if you've got nothing interesting for me, I'm going to jerk you around. But in the particularly grumpy mood I happen to be in now, I figured, instead, I'd just slam you publicly.

Besides, my foray into this thread has virtually nothing to do with any of what you've said.
I insist that reason's OP is more complicated than you seem to think, and while I don't expect you to assume you'd ever miscalculate, again, I don't leave it up to you.