By the term affect we understand a state of feeling characterized by a perceptible bodily innervation on the one hand and a peculiar disturbance of the ideational process on the other . I use emotion as synonymous with affect I distinguish—in contrast to Bleuler (v. Affectivity)—feeling from affect, in spite of the fact that no definite demarcation exists, since every feeling, after attaining a certain strength, releases physical innervations, thus becoming an affect. On practical grounds, however, it is advisable to discriminate affect from feeling, since feeling can be a disposable function, whereas affect is usually not so. Similarly, affect is clearly distinguished from feeling by quite perceptible physical innervations, while feeling for the most part lacks them
, or their intensity is so slight that they can only be demonstrated by the finest instruments, as for example the psycho-galvanic phenomenon . Affect becomes cumulative through the sensation of the physical innervations released by it. This perception gave rise to the James-Lang theory of affect, which would make bodily innervations wholly responsible for affects. As opposed to this extreme view, I regard affect as a psychic feeling-state on the one hand, and as a physiological innervation-state on the other; each of which has a cumulative, reciprocal effect upon the other, i.e. a component of sensation is joined to the reinforced feeling, through which the affect is approximated more to sensation (v. Sensation), and differentiated essentially from the state of feeling. Pronounced affects, i.e. affects accompanied by violent physical innervation, I do not assign to the province of feeling but to the realm of the sensation function (v. Function).